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In recent years, the flourishing of investment treaties has furthered the protection of
pharmaceutical patents as such treaties consider intellectual property (IP) a form of invest-
ment. Besides providing extensive protection to investor's rights, investment treaties pro-
vide patent owners direct access to investor-state arbitration. Patent owners can and have
used investment treaty arbitration to challenge alleged infringements of those rights by
measures of the host state. Investment arbitrators have scrutinized domestic regulatory
and judicial measures "for how they define the availability, validity, and scope of IP
rights."' Although these questions are "difficult and often elusive substantive questions"
of intellectual property law,2 they can affect a range of important public policy issues,
including public access to medicines. Yet arbitration is primarily a private dispute resolu-
tion mechanism. Most arbitral tribunals are neither open to the public nor obliged to
publish final decisions. They lack the transparency generally afforded by normal judicial
proceedings, even in disputes concerning public goods. Arbitrators may not have specific
expertise in international intellectual property law. Further, the awards have only limited
avenues for annulment and cannot be amended by the domestic courts.
A couple of examples may clarify the issues at stake. Apotex, a Canadian company,
recently filed no less than three investor-state arbitrations against the United States of
America, claiming that U.S. courts erred in applying federal law violating several provi-
sions of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA Chapter 11). Allegedly, the
erroneous application of the law prevented Apotex from commercializing generic versions
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1. Christine Haight Farley, TRIPS-Plus Trade and Invesment Agreements: Why More May be Less for Eco-
nomic Development, 35 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1061, 1065 (2014).
2. Id. ("IP law is notoriously full of grey areas due to finely balanced policy objectives.").
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of medicines which would be more cheaply available to patients. In turn, Eli Lilly, a major
US pharmaceutical company, filed an investor-state arbitration against Canada, after Ca-
nadian Federal Courts invalidated a pharmaceutical patent five years before its expiry.
The company claimed it suffered damages of at least 100 million Canadian Dollars and
requested the arbitral tribunal to award economic compensation for the alleged losses.
The patent invalidation, however, made a generic version more cheaply available to
patients.
Have arbitral tribunals taken public health considerations into account when adjudicat-
ing pharmaceutical patent-related cases? If so, have they considered public health as an
exception to investment treaty standards or as a part of the interpretation of the same
standards? What techniques are available to avoid regime-collisions between interna-
tional investment law and other fields including international intellectual property law and
public health law? Is investment arbitration a suitable forum to adjudicate pharmaceutical
patent-related disputes? Has investment treaty arbitration become an enforcement tool of
other areas of international law? Can investment treaty arbitration promote good govern-
ance in the pharmaceutical field? Is there convergence or divergence between interna-
tional investment law and other branches of international law governing pharmaceuticals?
Are there mechanisms to promote coherence? Is such coherence ultimately desirable?
This article addresses these questions, discussing recent investment disputes concerning
pharmaceuticals. It builds upon, develops, and originally contributes to my previous
scholarship which has focused on different aspects of international health law.3 While
earlier studies adopted a more hypothetical stance due to the relative lack of jurispru-
dence, this article aims to fill this gap in the available literature providing a critical assess-
ment of these emerging arbitrations. These patent-related arbitrations raise important
questions regarding the interplay between various international law regimes and interna-
tional investment law. The outcomes of these arbitrations can shape the development of
both international law and international investment law; and the relationship between the
two. The intended readership for this article that of specialists in the field of international
law. The article is especially relevant to those working in the areas of international eco-
nomic law, international health law and global governance. The article shows that phar-
maceutical corporations have increasingly made use of investment treaty arbitration, and it
critically assesses the potential impact of such arbitrations on the development of interna-
tional investment law and international law more generally.
The article shall proceed as follows. First, it explores what are pharmaceutical patents
and how they are governed at the international law level. Second, it briefly describes the
basic structure of investment treaty law and arbitration and explores how international
investment treaties govern pharmaceutical patents. Third, it analytically assesses the
growing tide of pharmaceutical patent-related arbitrations and their potential impact on
public health. Fourth, the article puts forwards some interpretative tools that may help
adjudicators to reconcile the possible antinomies between the investment treaty regime
governing pharmaceuticals and other bodies of international law.
3. See VALENTINA VADI, PUBLIC HEALTH IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION
(2013). For a more technical analysis, adopting a distinct international intellectual property focus, see idem.,
Towards a New Dialectics: Pharmaceutical Patents, Public Health and Foreign Direct Investments, 5 N.Y.U. J. IN-
TELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 113 (2015).
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The tension between patent holders and state authorities in the governance of pharma-
ceutical patents is but a specialized example of a broader recurrent interplay in interna-
tional law: the tension between foreign investors and the host states concerning the
appropriate balance between private and public interests. This article argues that arbitra-
tors should not put excessive emphasis on the private interests embodied by pharmaceuti-
cal patents, but adequate consideration should be paid to the public interest equally
embodied in these rights. An excessive protection of pharmaceutical patents can have a
potentially negative impact on the public health policies of the host state. This may seem
paradoxical as usually the protection of pharmaceuticals is associated with higher invest-
ments in the research and development of new medicines, and thus broader availability of
medicines in the long term with positive effects on patients' welfare. However, in some
cases, intellectual property has been used in an aggressive fashion by corporations in order
to chill public health regulation. This article aims at reconciling potential antinomies
between different international treaty regimes exploring the legal mechanisms that may
help policy makers and adjudicators to reconcile the protection of pharmaceutical patents
and public health in international investment law. The article concludes with the argu-
ment that while investor-state arbitration constitutes a major development in interna-
tional law and facilitates the access of foreign investors to justice, it may endanger the
fundamental values of the international community as a whole, unless arbitrators duly take
into account the public interest.
I. Pharmaceutical Patents, Intellectual Property and Public Health in
International Law
The patent system is based on a trade-off between promoting knowledge creation on the
one hand, and promoting knowledge diffusion on the other.4 A patent is a type of intel-
lectual property and constitutes a set of exclusive rights granted by a state to an inventor
for a limited period of time in exchange for detailed public disclosure of an invention.5
Patents are granted for inventions that are: (1) new, (2) involve an inventive step (nonobvi-
ous), and (3) capable of industrial application (useful).6 In the pharmaceutical sector, sig-
nificant research and development costs are associated with the development of new
medicines.7 Therefore, the patent protection of a given medicine aims to ensure the suita-
ble remuneration of the inventor's efforts and an incentive for the invention of new
medicines.8 At the same time, access to medicines plays a vital role in the public health
policies of states 9 and has human rights implications.1o Therefore, patent protection is
4. Kristen Jakobsen Osenga, Get the Balance Right!: Squaring Access with Patent Protection, 25 PAC. MC-
GEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEv. LJ. 309, 312-13 (2012).
5. Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 28, adopted Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M.
1197 [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement].
6. Id., art. 27.
7. Keith E. Maskus & Mohan Penubarti, How Trade Related are Intellectual Property Rights? 39 J. INT'L
EcONOMics 227, 242 (1995).
8. Id.
9. See generally INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH: PATENT LAW AND ACCESS To ESSENTIAL
MEDICINES (Thomas Pogge, Matthew Rimmer & Kim Rubenstein eds., 2010).
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limited in scope and time and is not an absolute right in that it may be subject to restric-
tions, namely, compulsory licenses and limited exceptions."
Pharmaceutical patent protection embodies and merges both private and public inter-
ests and is, as stated above, based on a trade-off. On the one hand, the patent system
rewards and fosters the inventive efforts of the patent owner awarding her exclusive rights
for a limited period of time. On the other hand, the patent system also acknowledges the
public interest in a two-fold manner. First, the invented medicines may save lives and
improve the quality of life of patients. Second, after the expiry of the patents, competitors
may build upon existing knowledge once it has entered the public domain and patients
may have access to cheaper generic versions of the same medicine. Even during the patent
lifespan, the enjoyment of intellectual property by the patent owner is not absolute: cer-
tain rules provide for limited exceptions, other uses of the patent without the patent
owner's consent may be allowed, and there are limits to patentability.12
However, in recent years, it has been a common criticism that legislatures and judges
have expanded the rights of patent owners too far, at the expense of the public interest.' 3
This expansion ultimately resulted in the emergence of antinomies between the protection
of patents and access to medicines. An absolutist protection of pharmaceutical patents
may have a negative impact on public well-being.14 Pharmaceutical patents create mo-
nopoly rights, and high prices may make medicines unaffordable to the poor. 5 "Ever-
greening" practices, i.e. the various ways in which pharmaceutical companies use regula-
tory processes to extend their intellectual property rights particularly over highly profita-
ble "blockbuster" medicines, can jeopardize access to medicines for the poor. In the case
in which the host state adopts emergency measures to facilitate access to medicines, thus
resulting in a reduction of corporate profits, the state's compliance with treaty obligations
to protect intellectual property rights may be disputed.16
Pharmaceutical patents produce benefits as well as costs, depending on the specifics of
the country's situation.' 7 The role of pharmaceutical patents in promoting research and
development of new medicines differs across countries depending on the amount of re-
sources devoted to creating intellectual assets,' 8 and the ratio between knowledge owned
and the knowledge needed by a country to develop the pharmaceutical sector.1 9 Even in
industrialized countries, the regulation of pharmaceuticals is a sensitive field due to its
important public policy implications. For instance, the price of vaccines-which help the
body to develop immunity to a particular disease-has increased in the last decades,
10. Hans Morton Haugen, Patent Rights and Human Rights: Exploring Their Relationship, 10 J. WORLD IN-
TELL. PROP. 97, 98 (2007).
11. Id. at 108.
12. Id. at 108-109.
13. Osenga, supra note 4, at 315.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 312.
16. Id. at 317.
17. See PETER DRAHos, Introduction, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTs: KNOWLEDGE, Ac-
CESS, AND DEVELOPMENT 1, 4 (Peter Drahos & Ruth Mayne eds., 2002).
18. See Carlos Prima Braga, Carsten Fink & Claudia Paz Sepulveda, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic
Development, in THE WTO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE KNOWLEDGE EcONOMY-CRITI-
CAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM AND THE WTO 254 (Keith E. Maskus ed.).
19. See, e.g., David M. Gould & William C. Gruben, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Economic
Growth, 48 J. DEv. EcON. 323, 324 (1996).
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straining public health budgets. 20 The price increase is due to the fact that vaccines are
now subject to patentability (which used not to be the case, at least in some countries
including the United States). 2 1 The fact that during the patent term patent holders have
monopoly rights of a sort has contributed to the price increase. 22
Because pharmaceuticals deal with several types of public goods, including knowledge,
governance, and public health, they are governed by different fields of international law,
including human rights law, international intellectual property law, and international
health law. Therefore, pharmaceutical regulation constitutes a regime compleX23 and is
characterized by institutional density. This section briefly examines the four main layers
of this regime complex: 1) human rights treaties; 2) international intellectual property
treaties; 3) investment treaties and 4) international health law.24
The human rights component of the pharmaceutical regime complex is provided by a
series of provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR).25 On the one hand, even without expressly mentioning intellectual
property, Article 15 of the ICESCR26 identifies the need to protect both public and pri-
vate interests in knowledge creation and knowledge diffusion.27 On the other hand, Arti-
cle 12 of the Covenant recognizes "the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health."28 Access to medicines has been consid-
ered to be a component of the right to health.29 Conceptualized after World War II, "this
right was undertheorized due to political reasons."3 0 Since the fall of the Berlin Wall,
however, "[e]conomic, social and cultural rights on the one hand, and civil and political
rights on the other, have been understood in their unity and complementarity."31 The
international, regional and national recognition of the right to health requires state au-
20. Elisabeth Rosenthal, The Price of Prevention: Vaccine Costs are Soaring, N.Y. TIMEs, July 2, 2014, at Al,
available at http://nyti.ms/lxjfQp2 (last updated July 8, 2014).
2 1. Id.
22. Id.
23. See Robert 0. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Climate Change 7-8 (Harvard
Project on Int'l Climate Agreements, Discussion Paper 2010-33), for a discussion on the notion of "regime
complex" as a range of multilevel regulatory frameworks at times diverging and at times converging if not
overlapping, introducing the notion of "regime complex" and defining it as a "loosely coupled set of specific
regimes."
24. Alan M. Anderson & Bobak Razavi, The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights: TRIPS, BITs and the
Search for Uniform Protection, 38 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 265, 269 (2010) (noting that international intellec-
tual property treaties have been adopted since the nineteenth century.).
25. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted on 16 Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR] (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
26. Id., art. 15.
27. Id.
28. Id., art. 12.
29. VALENTINA VADI, PUBLIC HEALTH IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION
(2013).
30. Id. at 27 ("Given the political divide between the Eastern and Western blocs determined by the Cold
War, the right to health as well as other economic, social and cultural rights were deemed to be politicized as
reflecting a socialist perspective. The traditional distinction between civil and political rights and economic,
social and cultural rights was also based on the assumption that while the first category of rights was suscepti-
ble to immediate realization, the second was deemed to be only of gradual implementation. The dichotomy
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thorities to adopt relevant policies to ensure the realization of this right. 32 Moreover,
access to medicines has been deemed to be a component of the right to life.33 Yet, state
resistance to proposals of creating a global human rights court and the fragmented land-
scape of international institutions in the human rights field have inevitably characterized
the evolution of the right to health and the right to life.34
International intellectual property treaties have been adopted since the nineteenth cen-
tury. The Paris Convention is the oldest treaty governing aspects of patent regulation.31
It conceptualizes intellectual property as an incentive to encourage innovation; 3 6 harmo-
nizes procedures relating to priority, registration, and licensing; and requires national
treatment for foreign patent owners.37 "In theory, a member that failed to comply with its
obligations under the Paris Convention could be sued before the International Court of
Justice." 38 But "no such cases have ever been brought." 39
Another intellectual property treaty, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS Agreement) under the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO),40 is the most comprehensive international treaty setting global standards
for medical knowledge governance. 4' It introduced pharmaceuticals as a patentable sub-
ject matter, requiring that patents be available in WTO member states "for any inven-
tions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are
new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application."42 While the
patent owner is given limited monopoly rights for twenty years, other business competi-
tors may replicate the compound as soon as this term expires.
32. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(II1) art. 25 (Dec.
10, 1948) ("[E]veryone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself
and his family, including . . . medical care."); Constitution of the World Health Organization, Preamble,
concluded Jul. 22, 1946, 14 U.N.T.S. 185 ("The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one
of the fundamental rights of every human being."); ICESCR, supra note 25, art. 12 (recognizing "the right of
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of Physical and mental health. . ."); see generally
BRIGr TOEBES, THE RIGHT To HEALTH AS A HUMAN RIGHT IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1999) (discussing
the right to health).
33. HOLGER HESTERMEYER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WTO: THE CASE OF PATENTS AND ACCESS TO
MEDICINES (2007); see generally BALANCING WEALTH AND HEALTH: THE BATTLE OVER INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES IN LATIN AMERICA (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Cesar Rodriguez-
Garavito eds., 2014) (on the interplay between access to medicines and intellectual property).
34. Laurence R. Helfer, Pharmaceutical Patents and the Human Right to Health: The Contested Evolution of the
Transnational Legal Order on Access to Medicines, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS 311, 317 (Terence Halli-
day & Greg Shaffer eds., 2014).
35. Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828
U.N.T.S 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
36. Rochelle Dreyfuss & Susy Frankel, From Incentive to Commodity to Asset: How International Law is Recon-
ceptualizing Intellectual Property 5 (New York Univ. Pub. Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 478,
2014).
37. Helfer, spra note 34, at 314.
38. Paris Convention, supra note 35, art. 28.
39. Dreyfuss & Frankel, supra note 36, at 5 n. 20.
40. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 5.
41. See also CARLOS CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A COM-
MENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT, (1st ed., 2007); DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT:
DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIs, (4th ed., 2012).
42. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 5, at 331.
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The very adoption of the TRIPS Agreement was controversial: developing countries
opposed its adoption, fearing that the introduction of high standards of intellectual prop-
erty protection would jeopardize access to a wide number of products including
pharmaceuticals.43 Some scholars also doubted that intellectual property could be linked
to trade as monopolies-such as those established by intellectual property-can in fact
restrict the market.44 Not by chance, an early reference to intellectual property appears in
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947)41 among the exceptions.4 6
Nevertheless, through intense negotiation and what has been named as linkage bargain-
ing-that is, linking negotiations on intellectual property to negotiations in other sectors
such as agriculture-the TRIPS Agreement was signed at the Marrakesh Ministerial con-
ference in 1994, as part of a package deal with the other Uruguay Round Agreements, and
it came into force in January 1995.47 Remarkably, the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement
"moved from framing IP as a barrier to trade into conceptualizing it as a tradable com-
modity in the name of facilitating trade . . . and emphasized the rhetoric of 'rights.' "4
The TRIPS Agreement provides for minimum international standards for intellectual
property protection, and Members cannot derogate or provide lower ceilings of protec-
tion.49 Members can enforce the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement through the WTO
Dispute Settlement Mechanism, which has compulsory jurisdiction over TRIPS-related
disputes. 0 WTO Members have the right to provide for more extensive protection than
is required by the Agreement, as long as they apply the general principles of the most-
favored-nation clause and national treatment under the Agreement," any intellectual
43. Jerome H. Reichmann, The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation with the Developing
Countries, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT.'L L. 441, 443 (2000) (pointing out that the TRIPS Agreement imposed
"relatively high" standards of intellectual property protection which de facto correspond to those used in
industrialized countries).
44. Michael Spence, Which Intellectual Property Rights are Trade-Related?, in ENVIRONMENT, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 263, 263-85 (Francesco Francioni ed., 2001).
45. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 31 U.S.T. 4919, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter
GATT].
46. Id., art. XX ("Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would
constute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to
prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: .. . (d) necessary to secure com-
pliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including
those relating to . . . the protection of patents, trademarks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive
practices.").
47. Jose E. Alvarez, The WTO as Linkage Machine, 96 Am. J. INT'L L. 146, 147 (2002) ("The VTO's
success in 'nesnng' issues within a broader context so that the 'fabric' of one became the foundation for
another, as well as in making possible package deals between previously unlinked issues.").
48. Dreyfuss & Frankel, supra note 36, at 3, 32 (also suggesting that the system may be "inclined to inter-
pret proprietary rights broadly while constructing user interests narrowly").
49. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 1.1.
50. Id., art. 64; Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the Uruguay Round: Putting
TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 275, 282 (1997) ("Members may, but shall not be
obliged to, implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement, provided
that such protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement.").
51. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 30, art. 1.1.
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property agreement negotiated subsequent to TRIPS by WTO members can only create
similar or higher standards (commonly known as "TRIPS-plus"). 52
International investment law constitutes "the last wave of IPR protection", considering
IP a form of investment.5 3 According to some scholars, the conversion of intellectual
property into an investment asset "emphasizes the rhetoric of property." 54 Has the coales-
cence of all of these norms and different layers of regulations contributed to creating a
strong system of intellectual property protection to the detriment of other public goods,
including public health?
By contrast to IP protection, another component of the regime complex governing
pharmaceuticals, international health law, is not a particularly well-developed and/or co-
herent field of international law.55 While there used to be a discrete number of binding
international conventions dealing with various aspects of public health before the World
War II, since the inception of the World Health Organization in 1948, this has changed
significantly. 6 The World Health Organization has traditionally favored non-legal ap-
proaches to health issues. 5 7 Perceiving itself as a sort of "transnational Hippocratic soci-
ety", 58 the institution, mainly composed of health specialists,59 has principally, if not
exclusively, developed medical guidelines and other nonbinding tools. It has developed
"an ethos that looks at global health problems as medical-technical issues to be resolved by
the application of the healing arts." 60 Instruments adopted by the WHO have been de-
scribed as "limited in scope and application" 61 as well as "historically, politically and struc-
turally inadequate to do what is needed." 62 Such instruments lack coordination and
binding force.63 International health law has not been an effective system, due to its
mainly non-legal approach, lack of enforcement powers and consequent states' failure to
52. In recent years, states have signed a number of regional and bilateral agreements including TRIPS-plus
provisions. On the phenomenon, see, e.g., Ruth L. Okediji, Back to Bilateralism? Pendulum Swings in Interna-
tional Intellectual Property Protection, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH J. 125, 141 (2003-2004) (describing the phe-
nomenon of forum shifting as a means of increasing the strength of protection of intellectual property rights).
53. Valentina S. Vadi, Towards A New Dialectics: Pharmaceutical Patents, Public Health and Foreign Direct In-
vesments, 5 J. or INTELL. & ENT. L. 1, 16 (2015).
54. Dreyfuss & Frankel, supra note 36, at 3.
55. See generally DAVID P. FIDLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PUBLIC HEALTH: MATERIAL ON AND
ANALYSIS OF GLOBAL HEALTH JURISPRUDENCE (2000); Shawn H.E. Harmon, International Puhlic Health
Law: Not so Much WHO as Why, and Not Enough WHO and Why Not?, 12 MED. HEALTH CARE & PHIL. 245,
245 (2009) ("[N]either the WHO ... nor international law . . . have yet played their necessary part in
promoting 'health for all."'); Jennifer Prah Ruger, Normative Foundations of Global Health Law, 96 GEo. L. J.
423, 424 (2008) (describing international health law as "a relatively new academic field").
56. Constitution of the World Health Organization, WHO (45th ed. Supp. 2006), http://www.who.int/
governance/eb/who-constituionen.pdf.
57. David P. Fidler, International Law and Global Public Health, 48 U. KAN. L. REv. 1, 22 (1999) ("[The]
historical penchant [of the WHO] for dealing with public health problems within a narrow 'medical-techni-
cal' approach.").
58. Id. at 23.
59. Id. at 22 ("WHO has historically been staffed predominantly by physicians, medical scientists, and
public health experts.").
60. David P. Fidler, The Future of the World Health Organization: What Role for International Law? 31VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1079,1099 (1998).
61. Harmon, supra note 55, at 251.
62. Id. (internal citation omitted).
63. Id. (noting that such instruments "are being developed ... in an uncoordinated ... manner" and "pale
in comparison with that of other international [organizations]").
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comply with its rules. 64 Only in the past decade did the WHO adopt a binding conven-
tion in the field of tobacco control.65 Rarely has the WHO participated in trade negotia-
tions or the resolution of international disputes even when such are linked to public
health.66 Only recently has the WHO cautiously started intervening in investment treaty
arbitration as a friend of the court (amicus curiae).6 7
In the absence of a well-articulated international health law regime, public health pro-
tection has remained a ftndamental prerogative and a police power of the state. States
have a right and a duty to protect public health. On the one hand, having a population is
one of the three elements required for statehood (together with territory and govern-
ment). 68 On the other hand, the state has assumed duties related to public health "as a
result of the social contract between it and its subjects/citizens." 69 Clearly, the state has
the power to adopt measures to protect its population as this protection constitutes one of
the conditions of its very existence.
Due to the fragmentation characterizing international law, the asymmetrical develop-
ment of international intellectual property law and international health law, elements of
public health governance have been devolved to a plethora of other organizations "whose
primary concerns and objectives are not health."70 Given the interconnectedness of health
with other global issues including trade and foreign investments (the so-called "issue
linkage")71 and the lack of a World Health Court, a plethora of international courts, in-
cluding investment treaty arbitral tribunals, have increasingly governed and/or impacted
upon public health. The following sections will examine this interplay focusing on how
international investment law governs pharmaceutical patents and how investment treaty
arbitral tribunals have adjudicated the relevant disputes.
II. Pharmaceutical Patents in International Investment Law
While the traditional focus of foreign direct investment used to be on tangible assets,
today it could not be more diverse. 72 Not only do investment flows encompass traditional
64. Jennifer Prah Ruger, Normative Foundations of Global Health Law, 96 GEo. LJ. 423, 438 (2008).
65. WHO FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL, WHO (2003), http://apps.who.int/iris/
bitstream/10665/42811/1/9241591013.pdf.
66. Harmon, supra note 55, at 251.
67. Clovis Trevino & Luke Eric Peterson, World Health Organization is Given Green-Light by Arbitrators to
Intervene in Philip Morris v. Uruguay Arbitration, Investment Arbitration Reporter, INv. ARB. REP (Feb. 20, 2015)
(noting that "[i]n their request to intervene, the WHO and the FCTC Secretariat contended that their sub-
mission 'may assist the tribunal in the determination of factual and legal issues' as it w[ould] provide evidence
of the relation between health warnings and labeling and the protection of public health, on tobacco control
globally which, in their view, may assist the tribunal in assessing the claimant's legitimate expectations and the
legal relation between the FCTC and the Switzerland-Uruguay BIT."); For a commentary of the specific
arbitration, see Valentina Vadi, Global Health Governance at a Crossroads: Trademark Protection v. Tobacco Control
in International Investment Law, 48 STAN. J. INT'L L. 93 (2012).
68. Convention on the Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19
(discussing the definition and rights of statehood).
69. Harmon, supra note 55, at 247.
70. Id. at 251.
71. Allyn L. Taylor, Global Governance, International Health Law and 1/HO: Looking Towards the Future, 80
WHO BULLETIN 975, 976 (2002).
72. Christopher S. Gibson, Latent Grounds in Investor-State Arbitration, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW INVESTMENT LAw & POLICY 397, 411 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2010).
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categories such as mining, oil extraction and infrastructure projects, but they also reach
new sectors such as telecommunications, media, health care and pharmaceuticals.73 Inter-
national investment agreements (IIAs) do not include detailed regulation of pharmaceuti-
cal patents. Rather, they briefly mention intellectual property rights as a form of
protected investment. Some IIAs incorporate a broad definition of investment that gener-
ally covers both tangible and intangible property.7 4 Other international investment trea-
ties generally refer to intellectual property rights, or explicitly indicate the types of
intellectual property covered, such as copyright, patents, industrial designs, trade secrets,
and trademarks and so on. 75 Notably, the first bilateral investment treaty (BIT) (signed
between West Germany and Pakistan in 1959) included "patents and technical knowl-
edge" in the definition of "investment." 76
Given the variety of treaty language used in different international investment treaties,
the question as to whether intellectual property constitutes an investment requires a case-
by-case analysis.77 Answering this question is crucial because if an intellectual property
owner is classified as an investor under the relevant investment treaty, she is entitled to the
procedural and substantive protections afforded by the treaty. While registered patents
are "covered investments" in most investment treaties, questions arise as to whether pat-
ent applications fall within the scope of a covered investment under the relevant invest-
ment treaty, given the fact that patents can only be acquired through registration.78 The
expectation of obtaining exclusive rights over an invention is of some value because patent
applications "can be sold and assigned to third parties." 7 9 Can patent applications be
deemed to be a form of intangible property even if it is not a form of intellectual property
yet? While some authors argue that applications for a patent fall within the scope of
protection offered by international investment agreements to intangible property, 0 cer-
73. Id.
74. For instance, Article 1l 39 (g) of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) states that "in-
vestment" includes "real estate or other property, tangible or intangible, acquired in the expectation or used
for the purpose of economic benefit or other business purposes." North American Free Trade Agreement,
U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 ILM 289, 605 (1993).
75. See, e.g., The Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the Dominican Republic on the Promo-
tion and Protection of Investments, Switz.-D.M., art. 1.2(d), Aug. 27, 2004, available at http://investmentpoli-
cyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3264 ("The term 'investments' shall include every kind of asset, in
particular, though not exclusively: . . . copyrights, industrial property rights (such as patents, utility models,
industrial designs or models, trade or service marks, trade names, indications of origin), technical processes,
know-how and goodwill."); see also Accordo tra il Governo della Repubblica Italiana e il Governo della
Repubblica di Cuba sulla Promozione e Protezione degli Investimenti, It.-Cuba, art. 1.1(d), May 5, 1993,
availahle at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/907 ("Per 'investimento' si intende,
indipendentemente dalla forma giuridica prescelta e dall'ordinamento giuridico di riferimento, ogni bene
investito da persone fisiche o giuridiche di una Parte Contraente nel territorio dell'altra, in conformith delle
leggi e dei regolamenti di quest'ultima. In tale contesto di carattere generale il temine 'investimento' indica:
... diritti d'autore, marchi commerciali, brevetti,designs indiustriali ed altri diritti di proprieth intellettuale ed
industriale, know-how, segreti commerciali, la ditta e l'avviamento.").
76. Bryan Mercurio, Awakening the Sleeping Giant: Intellectual Property Rights in International Investment
Agreements, 15 J. INT'L EcON. L. 871, 874 n. 8 (2012).
77. Ruth 1. Okediji, Is Intellectual Property "Investment"? Eli Lilly v. Canada and the International Intellectual
Property System, 35 U. PA. J. ITr'L L. 1121, 1126 (2013-14).
78. Mercurio, supra note 76, at 878.
79. Id.
80. Id. (suggesting that "applications for IPRs will in fact qualify as a covered investment").
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tain treaties expressly exclude this possibility." Interpretive uncertainties surround in-
vestment treaty provisions protecting "rights with respect to" intellectual property, 82 or
even refer to "patentable inventions." 83 The European Court of Human Rights has held
that both registered trademarks and applications to register trade marks were "property
rights" within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on
Human Rights.8 4 However, the fact that most investment treaties provide protection in
the post-establishment phase to both investors and their investments suggests that a case-
by-case analysis is needed. This is seemingly confirmed by the growing number of invest-
ment treaty arbitrations that have dealt with this question and will be examined below.
The specific protection of pharmaceutical patents through investment treaties not only
benefits pharmaceutical corporations,85 but can induce foreign direct investment (FDI) in
research and development of new products, stimulate local inventive activities, and en-
courage technology transfer into the country. 86 Technological innovation is generally rec-
ognized as an important means to stimulate economic development.8 7 Moreover,
innovation in the health sector is fundamental to human well-being. While intellectual
property can be a tool to advance human welfare,88 excessive protection of the same "may
decrease competition in the host country or raise entry barriers for smaller, foreign
firms."89 Although the notion of investment includes intellectual property rights, the sub-
stantive interplay between intellectual property and international investment law remains
uncharted. 90 The functioning of investment treaty obligations with regard to intellectual
property, the parties' expectations, and enforcement aspects of these treaties remain
largely unexplored.91 At the procedural level, investment treaties enable foreign investors
holding patents to have access to investment treaty arbitration. In doing so, they create a
set of procedural rights for the direct benefit of investors. 92 This is a major novelty in
international law, as customary international law does not provide such a mechanism. 93
81. See, e.g., ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, art. 4(c), Feb. 26, 2009 (limiting an "invest-
ment" to "intellectual property rights which are conferred pursuant to the laws and regulations of each Mem-
ber State.").
82. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of Hong Kong and the Government of Australia for the
Promotion and Protection of Investments, H.K.-Austl., art. 1(e)(iv), Oct. 15, 1993; see also Agreement Be-
tween the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Argentina for the Promotion and
Protection of Investment Can.-Arg., art. 1(a)(iv), April 29, 1993.
83. Treaty Between the United States of America and Jamaica Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement
and Protection of Investment, U.S.-Jam., March 7, 1997.
84. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 11, 2007) (Grand Chamber).
85. Okediji, spra note 77, at 1122 (noting that capital exporting countries favored the incorporation of
intellectual property obligations in bilateral investment treaties "to provide stronger and more stable protec-
tion for firms in developing countries").
86. John Barton, New Trends in Technology Transfer: Implications for National and International Policy, INT'L
CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEv., Issue Paper No. 18 (Feb. 2007).
87. U.N. CONE. TRADE & DEv. [UNCTAD], WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT FOREIGN DIRECT INVEST-
MENT AND THE CHALLENGE OF DEVELOPMENT 195 (1999).
88. Okediji, supra note 77, at 1133.
89. Id. at 1127.
90. For a seminal study, see Carlos A. Primo Braga & Carsten Fink, The Relationship Between Intellectual
Property Rights and Foreign Direct Investment, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT. L. 163, 170 (1998).
91. Okediji, supra note 77, at 1124.
92. See Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INv. LJ. 232, 256 (1995).
93. See id. at 255.
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Investor-state arbitration has become a standard feature in international investment trea-
ties since the 1980s. 94 The rationale for internationalizing investor-state disputes lies in
the assumed independence and impartiality of international arbitral tribunals, while na-
tional dispute settlement procedures are often perceived as biased or inadequate. 95 Arbi-
tration is also used because of perceived advantages in confidentiality and effectiveness.96
The arbitral process in investment arbitration presents characteristics similar to those in
a typical international commercial arbitration. 97 The composition of the tribunal is deter-
mined by the parties who generally choose law scholars or practitioners. Although the
right to choose an arbitrator may be considered the very essence of arbitration,98 this
practice may be problematic from a public policy perspective. 99 As one scholar explains,
while arbitrators are "expected to be both independent of the party appointing them and
impartial . . . it is usually conceded that without violating in any way this theoretical
obligation of independence, the arbitrator may quite acceptably share the political or eco-
nomic philosophy or 'legal culture' of the party who has nominated [her] . . . and may
therefore be assumed from the very beginning to be 'sympathetic' to that party's conten-
tions or 'favorably disposed' to its positions." 0 0
Confidentiality is one of the main features of arbitral proceedings as generally hearings
are held in camera and documents submitted by the parties remain confidential in princi-
ple.' 0' Final awards may or may not be published, depending upon the parties' will. Even
the names of the parties-much less the details of the dispute-may remain undisclosed.
While confidentiality suits commercial disputes well, the same may be problematic in in-
vestor-state arbitration, because arbitral tribunals can require states to compensate inves-
tors for regulations that hurt the latter. The lack of transparency may hamper efforts to:
track investment treaty arbitrations, monitor their frequency, and to assess the policy im-
plications that flow therefrom.1 0 2 Because investment disputes are settled using a variety
94. See David Sedlak, ICSID's Resurgence in International Investment Arbitration: Can the Momentum Hold?,
23 PENN ST. INT'L L. REv. 147, 149 (2004).
95. See, e.g, ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUlIS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES
(2009) 24.
96. See Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization ofInvestment Disputes: The Role ofICSID and
MIGA, 1 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN iNv. L.J.1, 4 (1986).
97. Nigel Blackaby, Investment Arbitration and Commercial Arhitration (or the Tale of the Dolphin and the
Shark), in PERVASIVE PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 217, 232 (Julian Lew & Loukas Mistelis
eds., 2006).
98. Pierre Lalive, Conclusions, in I.C.C., THE ARBITRAL PROCESS AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF ARBITRA-
TION (1991).
99. Kenneth Vandevelde, The Political Economy ofa Bilateral Investment Treaty (1998) 92 Am. J. INT' L. 636.
100. Alan S Rau, Integrity in Private ]udging, 38 S. TEx. L. REv. 485, 507 (1997).
101. Some hearings have been broadcasted in special viewing rooms at the ICSID headquarters in Washing-
ton, but were not webcasted. See Lise Johnson, As Hearings Kick Off in Apotex v. USA Arbitration, New Plead-
ings Show Continued Sparring Over Canadian Drug Companies's Claim to Own NAFTA-Protected Investments,
INv. ARB. REP. (Nov. 18, 2013), https://www.iareporter.com/articles/as-hearings-kick-off-in-apotex-v-usa-
arbitration-new-pleadings-show-continued-sparring-over-canadian-drug-companies-claim-to-own-nafta-
protected-investments (subscripnon required).
102. While more and more awards have been published, some arbitrations and the relevant awards were
given minimal publicity. For instance, a redacted version of the Servier award, discussed below, was released
by a Polish Government agency following a request under the country's access to information laws. A May
2013 ruling of the Warsaw District Administrative Court directed Poland's Ministry of Health to release the
Servier award, subject to any redactions of confidential commercial information. A previously released copy
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of arbitral rules-not all of which provide for public disclosure of claims-there can be no
accurate accounting of all such disputes. Yet, arbitral awards rendered under investment
treaties should be publicly available. That some portion of the iceberg remains hidden
from view should be a matter of concern given the public policy implications of such
disputes.
In recent years, there have been various efforts to make investment arbitration more
transparent. In response to calls from civil society groups, the three parties to the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (including Canada, the United States, and
Mexico) have pledged to disclose all NAFTA arbitrations and open future arbitration
hearings to the public.103 Similarly, the International Centre for Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes (ICSID) requires public disclosure of dispute proceedings under its aus-
pices,' 0 4 including the registration of all requests for conciliation or arbitration and an
indication of the date and method of the termination of each proceeding. Increasingly,
arbitral tribunals have allowed public interest groups to present amicus curiae briefs and
have increased access to the arbitral process. 0 5 These important developments, however,
involve the conduct of a limited number of investment dispute proceedings. Indeed, the
vast majority of existing treaties do not mandate such transparency, which means that
most of the proceedings are resolved behind closed doors. The recent adoption of the
United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration
(the "Mauritius Convention on Transparency"), by which Parties to investment treaties
concluded before April 1, 2014, express their consent to apply the UNCITRAL Rules on
Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, may increase the transparency of
such disputes. 0 6
Finally, awards rendered against host states are, in theory, readily enforceable against
host state property worldwide due to the widespread adoption of the New York 0 7 and
Washington Conventions. 0 8 In arbitrations under the ICSID Convention, awards are
only subject to an internal annulment process, and the award is enforced as a local court
of the 2012 award offered only the cover page and signature page. See Jarrod Hepburn, Poland Releases a New
- Less Redacted - Version ofAward from Dispute with French Pharma Companies; MFN Can't Broaden Investment
Treaty's Arbitration Clause, INv. ARB. REP. (Oct. 24, 2013), https://www.iareporter.com/articles/poland-re-
leases-a-new-less-redacted-version-of-award-from-dispute-with-french-pharma-companies-mfn-cant-broad
en-investment-treatys-arbitration-clause (subscripnon required).
103. Statement of the Free Trade Commission on Non-Disputing Party Participation, NAFTA FREE TRADE
COMM'N, Oct. 7, 2003, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38791.pdf.
104. See ICSID, Administrative and Financial Regulations, regulation 22, as amended and effective Apr. 10,
2006, available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/partC-chap04.htm#r22.
105. ICSID, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, r. 37, as amended and effective Apr. 10, 2006,
available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StadcFiles/basicdoc/partF-chapO4.htm#r37 [hereinafter IC-
SID Arbitration Rules].
106. United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, opened for sig-
nature Mar. 17, 2015, U.N.T.S., https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treades/2014/12/20141210%2011-52%20AM/
CHXXII_3.pdf. The Convention will enter into force six months after the deposit of the third instrument
of ratification [hereinafter Mauritius Convention on Transparency]. The list of the parties to the Convention
as well as signatories is available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitraltexts/arbitration/2014Trans-
parencyConventionstatus.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2016).
107. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 330
U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention].
108. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States,
Mar. 18 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
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judgment, thus being exempted from supervision of local courts. 109 In non-ICSID arbi-
trations, annulment is subject to the supervision of the courts at the seat of arbitration, and
enforcement is governed by the New York Convention, which allows for non-recognition
and non-enforcement of an award only on limited grounds.11o Thus, if the arbitration is
sited in a country other than the host state, then there may be no capacity whatsoever for
the host government to challenge the award in its own legal system.
Given the characteristics of the arbitral process, significant issues arise in the context of
disputes involving pharmaceuticals. Arbitration structurally constitutes a private model of
adjudication. Yet, arbitral awards ultimately shape the relationship between the state, on
the one hand, and private individuals on the other."' Arbitrators determine matters such
as the legality of governmental activity, the degree to which individuals should be pro-
tected from regulation, and the appropriate role of the state.11 2 In cases involving public
health, one may wonder whether investment arbitration provides an adequate forum.
Furthermore, the mere possibility of a dispute with a powerful investor can exert a chilling
effect on governments' decisions to regulate in the public interest.
III. Investor-State Arbitrations Concerning Pharmaceuticals
Until recently, it was rare to hear of any investment dispute concerning pharmaceuti-
cals. This seems to be counterintuitive, given the economic importance of pharmaceutical
patents and the flourishing of arbitrations concerning pharmaceuticals among private par-
ties. To solve this puzzle, several considerations need to be taken into account.
First, the available data may represent just the tip of the iceberg, given the limited
transparency of investment arbitration. While ICSID makes the existence of all proceed-
ings public and generally encourages the publication of awards, other arbitral institutions
do not necessarily disclose their dockets of cases, and even when they do so, they do not
publish the awards unless the parties so agree. Finally, other arbitrations are purely ad
hoc, and thus their very existence will remain unknown. Therefore, it is likely that the
scarcity of cases in this matter is due not to an absence of disputes, but to the lack of
transparency of investment treaty arbitration.
Second, with regard to claims concerning pharmaceutical patents, several courts and
tribunals are available. The recent process of internationalization of IP protection has not
eliminated the traditional judicial remedies, but has added further avenues for dispute
settlement. National courts always represent an available option to foreign investors. As
pharmaceutical patents are territorial in nature, they are subject to the national laws of
each individual country. At the regional level, the Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU) has adjudicated several cases dealing with intellectual property in general and
pharmaceutical patents in particular. Even human rights courts have adjudicated intellec-
tual property related cases. For instance, the European Commission of Human Rights
(ECoHR) has deemed that intellectual property is a form of property and is thus protected
109. Id., art. 52.
110. New York Convention, supra note 107, at art. V.
111. Gus VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAw 70 (2007).
112. M. Sornarajah The Clash of Globalizations and the International Law on Foreign Investment 10(2) CAN.
FOREIGN POLY 1, 12 (2003).
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under Article 1 of the first Protocol of the Convention." 3 Finally, at the international
level, the World Trade Organization dispute settlement mechanism constitutes an addi-
tional dispute settlement mechanism, in case a state violates its commitments under the
TRIPS Agreement." 4
Third, investment disputes are extremely expensive. Initiating an investment dispute
may prove to be a suitable option only for large corporate actors.
Finally, knowledge about pharmaceutical patents is still too limited among investment
lawyers and knowledge about investment treaty arbitration is still too limited among IP
lawyers. Both intellectual property and foreign direct investment have long been consid-
ered to be highly technical subjects and have come to the frontline of legal debate only
very recently. Therefore, for a long time, there has been a mutual neglect between inter-
national investment law and intellectual property law. In practice, this meant that invest-
ment disputes focused mainly on tangible forms of investments. 115
Recently, however, IP holders have started filing investment treaty arbitrations to pro-
tect their patents and other forms of IP. There are several reasons for this change. First,
the ICJ and the WTO dispute settlement system are inter-state dispute resolution mecha-
nisms. Recourse to the ICJ requires the exercise of diplomatic protection of the home
state of the given corporation. However, diplomatic protection constitutes a prerogative
and not a duty for states which may exercise it at their will. While companies lobby their
governments to file disputes before the WTO dispute settlement mechanisms, it is up to
the states to decide whether to bring a claim. Governments are warier litigators than
many companies. They seek to maintain good diplomatic relations, and since they must
live by the rules their own litigation establishes, they are cautious in promoting interpreta-
tions of international law that could limit their regulatory freedom. When IP violations
are limited in scope, the home state will be reluctant to initiate a trade dispute for settling
trifles because of political considerations. Furthermore, even if the state brought an inter-
national claim for its own injury, it would be under no obligation to pay any reparation to
the national actually injured. While remedies under the Uruguay Round Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU)116 have a prospec-
tive character, investment treaties allow the private party to get compensation for past
wrongs by the host state. Moreover, the investor would exercise limited, if any, control
over the dispute settlement strategy. Finally, the existence of a pending trade dispute does
not impede the foreign investor from having recourse to arbitration. Nor does the exis-
tence of a pending investment dispute impede the home state from submitting a complaint
to the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM)."17 In any case, patent disputes have
113. See generally Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Overlaps and Conflict Norms in Human Rights Law: Approaches
of European Courts to Address Intersections with Intellectual Property Rights, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 70 (Christopher Geiger ed., 2015).
114. Joost Pauwelyn, The Dog That Barked But Didn't Bite: 15 Years of Intellectual Property Disputes at the
wTo, 1 J. INT'L Disp. SETTLEMENT 389 (2010).
115. See, e.g., AHS Niger & Menzies Mid. E. & Afr. S.A. v. Repuhlic of Niger, ICSID Case No. ARB/ 1/11,
Award (July 2013) (where Niger was found liable for expropriation of airport services concession, but no
damages due for subsequent "misuse" of intellectual property).
116. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 UNTS 401, 33 ILM 1226 (1994).
117. Even on similar matters the investment treaty dispute and the trade dispute are not identical disputes:
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not been common before the WTO DSM."18 Scholars have noted that "there remain
questions regarding the effectiveness of the WTO DSM in the TRIPS context."119 It
seems that "the number of TRIPS disputes has consistently decreased over time."12 0
While states may have increasingly complied with their TRIPS obligationsl2l and/or in-
creasingly settled potential disputes,1 22 "[t]he monitoring role of the Council for TRIPS
might explain the reduction in the use of the DSM to resolve IP disputes. The Council's
effectiveness as a monitoring body might be working to pre-empt potential disputes well
before they would reach the DSM."123
Second, investment arbitration may be a suitable choice when the host state judiciary
does not seem to ensure fair trials or impartiality. In such circumstances, the foreign
investor may immediately refer the dispute to arbitration.1 24 Otherwise, the inves-
tor-state dispute settlement mechanism may constitute the last resort when the case has
already been discussed at the national level and the foreign investor is unsatisfied with the
result because of discrimination, denial of justice or other reasons.
Third, the dispute settlement chapters of a number of Free Trade Agreements include
the possibility of filing non-violation complaints even with regard to intellectual property
rights.1 25 Any measure that does not appear to directly violate treaty provisions, but is
nevertheless sufficiently disadvantageous to the investor's intellectual property, can fall
To have identical disputes, three elements are needed: personae (same parties), petitum (same ob-
ject) and causa petendi (same legal grounds). Not only do investment disputes and trade disputes
have different parties, but they also present different petita and causa petendi. With regard to the
parties, while trade disputes are interstate disputes, investor-state arbitrations typically involve a
state and a private actor. With regard to the object of the dispute, while VTO cases deal with
interstate trade, investment disputes deal with foreign investment in the host state. With regard
to the causa petendi or legal grounds of the disputes, the legal instruments to be interpreted and
applied to the disputes are different. In the case of investment disputes, relevant investment trea-
ties and customary law or, in some cases, the national law will constitute the applicable law. In
the case of trade disputes, the DSU empowers the DSB to clarify the provisions of the covered
agreements.
VALENTINA VADi, ANALOGIES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 151 (2015).
118. But see Canada - Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS1 14/R, Panel Report (Mar. 20,
2000) (holding that the TRIPS permits generic producers to manufacture a given pharmaceutical during the
life of the patent; only stockpiling is deemed incompatible with Article 30); India-Patent Protection for Phar-
maceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R, Panel Report (Dec. 19, 1997).
119. Yoshifumi Fukunaga, Enforcing TRIPS: Challenges of Adjudicating Minimum Standards Agreements,
BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 23 (2008) 868, 879 (noting that "the use of the VTO DSM to resolve TRIPS disputes
has fallen, while its use to resolve general trade disputes continues unabated").
120. Id. at 887.
121. Id. at 888-889 ("[M]ore than half of the disputes concerning TRIPS were settled within the consulta-
tion process through a mutually agreed solution' and that 'even the number of these settled-before adjudica-
tion cases is declining. Perhaps, however, this decline can also be explained as a by-product of the DSM's
effectiveness.").
122. See, e.g., Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, Brazil-Measures Affecting
Patent Protection, WT/DS199/3 (Jan. 9, 2001).
123. Fukunaga, supra note 119, at 894, 897 ("Compared to adjudication before the DSM, the Council's
monitoring process is less adversarial and thus is less likely to offend the respondent country. . .. [U]nder the
TRIPS Agreement the reporting obligations are specific enough and the number of laws to be reviewed is
small enough that the Council is able to perform its task effectively.").
124. However, in case of denial of justice claims, the exhaustion of local remedies is needed.
125. GATT,mpra note 45, art. XXIII(1)(b)-(c). See also Susy Frankel, Challenging Trips-PlusAgreements: The
Potential Utility of Non-Violation Disputes, 12 J INT EcON. L. 1023 (2009).
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within the category of non-violation complaints. While the aim of the provision is to
maintain the balance of benefits struck during negotiations, the vagueness of the clause
transfers the authority to decide when the investor has suffered enough disadvantages
from the treaty negotiating parties to arbitral panels. In the parallel WTO system, exten-
sion of this clause to IP regulation was extremely controversial during the TRIPS negotia-
tions. While the TRIPS Agreement provides for such a remedy,12 6 WTO Members have
agreed not to use these complaints under the TRIPS Agreement for the time being,
adopting a moratorium. 12 7 From a historical perspective, non-violation complaints were
introduced into the GATT 1947 because of the general character of its obligations. There
is no such need with regard to intellectual property, whose rules were already detailed in
the TRIPS Agreement and other international conventions such as the Paris Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property.1 28 There are indications that non-violation
complaints have been raised before investment tribunals as well.1 29
Finally, as noted by Gibson, modem economies have become "predominantly 'concep-
tual', reflecting the vital role of ideas in . . . products and services . . ."130 In a globalized
world, science, technology, and creativity generate economic value and increase the signif-
icance and centrality of intellectual property.131 Foreign investments are reflecting the
increasing importance of "intellectual capital" as a source of wealth generation and of
intellectual property rights protecting knowledge goods.1 32
In recent years, a growing number of investor-state arbitrations concerned the way host
states govern the pharmaceutical sector. Some of these disputes are related to the way
patents are governed; others relate to various issues ranging from the regulation of com-
petition law and policy,133 or the implementation of harmonization measures required by
the European Union.1 34 More generally, these disputes raise the question as to whether,
by providing extensive protection to intellectual property, international investment law
and arbitration may unduly infringe upon the regulatory autonomy of states in the phar-
maceutical sector, potentially affecting fundamental public health issues.
126. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 64.2.
127. The 9th VTO Ministerial Conference held in Bali, Indonesia (Dec. 3-7, 2013) reiterated the morato-
rium until its next session to be held in Nairobi, Kenya, in December 2015. The United States and Switzer-
land have asked for reconsideration of this issue, and the TRIPS Council is examining the scope and
modalities for non-violation complaints.
128. Paris Convention, supra note 35.
129. Luke Eric Peterson, Newly Disclosed Document Shows that Pharma Corp Hopes to Construe Alleged Non-
Compliance with Patent Treaties as a Breach of Investment Treaty, Ji'wv. ARB. REP. (Dec. 10, 2012).
130. Gibson, supra note 72, at 398.
131. Id. at 412.
132. Id. at 398.
133. For instance, reportedly Uruguay is facing an arbitration claim over a recent decree that places limits
on concentration of ownership in Uruguay's pharmacy sector. A US investment fund has filed Notices of
Dispute pursuant to the Spain-Uruguay and the U.S.-Uruguay bilateral investment treaties respectively,
alleging that that the decree harms that company's recent investment in a chain of local pharmacies. Luke
Eric Peterson, Uruguay Threatened over Decree affecting Ownership of Pharmacies, Iw. ARB. REP. (May 13,
2014).
134. For instance, the Servier v. Poland case arose because of regulatory measures adopted by Poland to
implement EU law. Luke Eric Peterson, France's Second Largest Pharmaceutical Company Quietly Pursues Arbi-
tration against Republic of Poland, Jiw. ARB. REP. (Aug. 19, 2011).
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Investment treaty disputes concerning pharmaceutical patents give rise to both jurisdic-
tional, merits and quantum issues. First, some disputes will center on the question as to
which economic activities amount to an investment, and thus whether the dispute will be
within the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction. Second, although it may be very difficult to
prove, an affected patent owner may claim that an unlawful expropriation has taken place.
Third, if an expropriation has occurred, claims may concern the adequacy of the amount,
or mode, of compensation. Fourth, the patent owner may also allege violation of the fair
and equitable treatment standard. Finally, some claims may concern alleged discrimina-
tion suffered by the foreign investor. This section will examine these varieties of claims.
A. THE NOTION OF INVESTMENT
Addressing the question as to whether certain economic activities relating to pharma-
ceutical products amount to an investment is crucial as a positive answer contributes to
establishing the subject matter jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal.135 While international
investment treaties provide different definitions of investment, the ICSID Convention
does not provide a definition of investment. 136 Rather, it provides that ICSID jurisdiction
extends "to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment." 137 In practice this has
meant that commentators and arbitral tribunals have elaborated a number of criteria for
defining the term.1 38 Most notably, the leading test was elaborated by the SaliniTribunal,
in the context of a dispute arising out of the construction of a highway. The Salini test
includes four elements: 1) a contribution of money or other assets of economic value; 2) a
certain duration; 3) an element of risk; and, 4) a contribution to the host state's develop-
ment.1 39 The need for the last element is sometimes put in doubt.1 40
An interesting case, which shows that the notion of investment should be clarified with
reference to the relevant international treaty text rather than domestic notions, is Servier
and Others v. Poland.141 While the defendant argued that the claimants did not have any
investments in the host state itself under Polish law,142 Servier argued that "it [was] the
Treaty, not Polish law, that [was] relevant in assessing whether Servier's assets [were] pro-
tected investments." 143 The Tribunal held that it possessed jurisdiction,14 4 acknowledging
that the companies were incorporated in France, and therefore it had jurisdiction ratione
135. See ICSID Convention, supra note 108, art. 2 5(1) ("The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any
legal dispute arising directly out of an investment.").
136. Alex Grabowski, The Definition ofInvestment under the ICSID Convention: A Defense of Salini, 15 Cm. J.
INT'L L. 287, 293 (2014) (citing ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 105, r. 1(1)(3) ("The signatories to the
[ICSID] convention purposefully left the term 'investment' undefined when granting the body jurisdiction
over matters of international investment.").
137. ICSID Convention, supra note 108.
138. Grabowski, supra note 136, at 293 ("A variety of tribunals have applied a plethora of different tests.").
139. Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v. Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on jurisdiction, T 52 (July
23, 2001), 42 I.L.M. 609 (2003).
140. Quiborax S. A. v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/2, Decision onjurisdiction, T 220 (Sept. 27 2012)
(arguing that while the ICSID Convention attempts to foster economic development via international invest-
ment, such development is not a necessary element of investment).
141. Les Laboratoires Servier, S.A.S., v. Poland, UNCITRAL, Award, TT 515, 532 (Feb. 14, 2012).
142. Id. at T 222.
143. Id.
144. Id. at T 510.
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personae.14 On the other hand, it highlighted that under the terms of the treaty, it had
jurisdiction ratione materiae "only for divestment measures" i.e. expropriation claims.146
The mere sale of pharmaceutical products does not amount to an investment. In Italy v.
Cuba, an interstate investment treaty arbitration initiated by the Republic of Italy,147 an
arbitral tribunal recently clarified that the mere trade of medicines does not amount to an
investment. 148 Italy espoused the claims of sixteen investors operating in different fields
and raised claims in its own name for breach of the BIT.149 It sought the payment of _1
from Cuba as symbolic compensation and of several millions of U.S. dollars as compensa-
tion for the injury suffered by its investors.15 0 One of the investors, Menarini Societa
Farmaceutica s.r.l., a pharmaceutical company, settled the claim directly and ceased to
invoke diplomatic protection.' Therefore, Italy informed the tribunal that in light of
this circumstance, it withdrew its diplomatic protection.15 2 But, it did not withdraw the
claim in its own name.1 53
The claimant argued that the agreement between Menarini and Medicuba, an entity
affiliated with the Cuban Ministry of Health, did not relate merely to the supply of
medicines but also included the research and development of new pharmaceutical prod-
ucts. 1 5 4 The claimant also stressed the duration of the contract, the collaboration with
local agents, and the particular importance of the given medicines to public health in
Cuba.1 55 The respondent counter-argued that Menarini was not an "investor" as it merely
sold its products to Medicuba and had no subsidiary in Cuba.156 According to the respon-
dent, contacts with local agents should be considered a normal business practice, and the
organization of a cardiology conference was merely aimed at marketing related products
and should not be conceived as evidence of an investment. 157 Cuba concluded by stressing
that it had reached an agreement with the company, according to which the state would
have paid its invoices, while the company would have started its commercial operations
with Medicuba again.1 58
The tribunal defined investment as any economic activity carried out by an investor
characterized by a contribution to the economic development of the host state of certain
145. Id. at T 518.
146. Id. at T 519.
147. See, e.g., Enrico Milano, The Investment Arbitration between Italy and Cuba: The Application of Customary
International Law under Scrutiny, 11 L. & PRAc. INT'L COURTS & TRIBUNALS 499, 500 (2012) (defining this
arbitration as "a landmark case ... to the extent that it has constituted the first inter-State proceedings in the
history of modern BITs."). See generally Michele Potesta, Republic of Italy v. Republic of Cuba, 106 AM. J. INT'L
L. 341 (2012). See also Anthea Roberts, State-to-State Invesment treaty Arhitration: A Hybrid Theory of Interde-
pendent Rights and Shared Interpretive Authority, 55 HARVARD INT'L L. J. 1 (2014).
148. Italy v. Cuba, ad hoc State-State Arbitration, Final Award, T 219 (Jan. 1, 2008), available at http://www
.italaw.com/cases/580.
149. Id. at T 46.
150. Id. at T 96(1)(e).
151. Id. at T 39.
152. Id. at T 1.
153. Id. at para 93.
154. Italy, Final Award, spra note 148, at T 89.
155. Id. at T 90.
156. Id. at T 134.
157. Id.
158. Id. at T 136.
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duration and involving commercial risks taken on by the investor. 15 9 Therefore, it dis-
missed Italy's claims concerning Menarini Societh Farmaceutica due to lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. After examining the contract between Menarini and Medicuba, tell-
ingly entitled 'Contrato de Compra-Venta' (contract of sale),160 the tribunal held that the
given commercial activity was not an investment but a sale of pharmaceuticals.161 As there
was neither contribution of resources into Cuba nor assumption of risk (in addition to and
beyond the mere risk of nonpayment), the tribunal held that such sale of goods did not
constitute an investment protected under the Italy-Cuba BIT.162 The tribunal added that
sponsoring medical congresses does not qualify the subsequent sales of medicines as in-
vestments as such activity is a classic marketing practice.1 63 The issue as to whether cross-
border sales of pharmaceuticals constitute investment was also raised in the Servier
award.1 64 But the heavily redacted award does not allow further clarification on this point.
More recently, in Apotex Holdings Inc., Apotex Inc. v. United States of America (Apotex
III),16s the claimants sought over $1 billion in damages from the United States after the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) imposed an Import Alert on certain generic
medicines that Apotex Inc. produced in Canada, exported to the United States and a U.S.-
based Apotex subsidiary sold in that market.1 6 6 The Import Alert was imposed after FDA
inspections of Apotex facilities in Canada found noncompliance with good pharmaceutical
manufacturing practices.1 67 The respondent emphasized that Apotex produced all its
products in Canada.1 68 The United States did not view the cross-border trade of
pharmaceuticals as an investment. 169 The claimants argued that they had the following
investments in the United States: 1) certain intellectual property rights, that is, abbrevi-
ated new drug applications (ANDAs), directly held by Apotex Inc. and indirectly held by
Apotex Holdings;170 and 2) Apotex Corp., a U.S.-based subsidiary of Apotex Holdings,
that markets pharmaceuticals produced in Canada.171
The tribunal held that ANDAs were not "investments" in the United States.1 72 In this
regard the tribunal followed previous awards (Apotex I and II), which rejected claims that
159. Italyv. Cuba, ad hoc State-State Arbitration, Interim Award, T 81 (March 15, 2005) (http://www.italaw
.com/cases/580) (http://www.italaw.com/cases/580) ("[S]auf dispositions contraires specifiques d'unTrait6 Bi-
lateral de protection des Investissements, trois elements sont requis pour que ion se trouve en presence d'un
investissement: un apport, la dur6e et une prise de risque de la part de linvestisseur.... Ceci permet
d'6carter, par exemple, les simples operations de vente.").
160. Italy, Final Award, spra note 148, at T 219.
161. Id. at ¶¶ 219, 220.
162. Id.
163. Id. at T 220 (clarifying that "le fait que Menarini aurait sponsoris6 des congres medicaux, ce qui n'est
d'ailleurs pas etabli ne permet pas de qualifier d'investissement la vente des medicaments en cause, puisqu'il
s'agit d'operations classiques de promotion des produits vendus").
164. See Servier, Award, spra note 141.
165. Apotex Holdings Inc, Apotex Inc. v. United States (Apotex Ill), ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/1, Award
(Aug. 25, 2014).
166. Id. at ¶¶ 2.34, 3.6.
167. Id. at ¶¶ 3.52, 3.199.
168. Id. at T 2.51.
169. Apotex III, supra note 165, at T 2.51.
170. Id. at T 2.7.
171. Id. at T¶ 2.5, 2.6.
172. Id. at T 7.43.
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applications for the sale of medicines into a host state could be considered investments.17 3
The tribunal clarified that even if preparing those applications required significant ex-
penses, the true business activity was the production of the medicines in the home state for
export in the host state.1 74 One of the three arbitrators dissented from the tribunal's con-
clusion.17 He suggested that finally approved ANDAs can be bought and sold and are in
other ways treated as property under U.S. law.176 Therefore, the only investment was the
subsidiary Apotex Corp. Commentators criticized the award on the latter point, submit-
ting that it "blurs the line between trade and investment disputes," and argued companies
might use their subsidiaries "as a kind of Trojan horse" for obtaining protection under the
relevant BIT.177
In conclusion, the question as to whether intellectual property constitutes an invest-
ment requires a case-by-case assessment. Mere sales of pharmaceutical goods do not
amount to investments. In fact, rather than constituting investments in the local econ-
omy, such sales can "preserve export markets for the patent owner, leading to welfare
losses for the host country," potentially "impeding local innovation" and increasing the
costs of medicines.1 78 Patent applications create a mere expectation of obtaining a gov-
ernment grant. Unregistered inventions do not constitute patents. Although some argue
that the application is a form of intangible property, "the question as to whether a patent
application can be considered an investment depends on the precise wording of the rele-
vant [BIT]."179 For example, the U.S.-Jamaica BIT covers patentable inventions.180
More importantly, Okediji points out that "[n]o determination of intellectual property
as an 'investment' is per se neutral"; rather, it can affect both domestic and foreign compa-
nies.18 1 Therefore, it seems crucial that when treating intellectual property as investment,
arbitrators consider the relevant policy choices underlying given measures, 18 2 i.e. the abil-
ity of the host state to calibrate national policies to local conditions and needs.
B. EXPROPRIATION
International investment treaties provide for protection against unlawful expropriation.
With regard to expropriation claims, arbitration will be concerned with the issues of what
acts of the state may be characterized as amounting to an unlawful expropriation. Treaty
provisions lack precise definitions of expropriation and their language encompasses a po-
173. Apotex Inc v. United States (Apotex I & II), UNCITRAL, Award on jurisdiction and Admissibility, T9
243, 245 (June 14, 2013), available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italawl550
.pdf.
174. Id. at T 245.
175. Apotex III, supra note 165, at ¶¶ 7.63-7.66.
176. Id. at T 7.66.
177. LiseJohnson, New Weaknesses: Despite a Major Win, Arbitration Decisions in 2014 Increase the USs Future
Exposure to Litigation and Liahility, COLUM. CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE DEv. 1, 4 (2015).
178. Okediji, snpra note 77, at 1126.
179. Gibson, supra note 72, at 433.
180. Id.
181. Okediji, snpra note 77, at 1127.
182. Id. at 1136 (illustrating "the dangers of treating intellectual property as 'investment' per se, isolated
from its appropriate policy domains").
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tentially wide variety of state activity that may interfere with pharmaceutical patents.8 3
Two dichotomies characterize the notion of expropriation: the distinction between lawful
and unlawful expropriation, and that between direct and indirect expropriation. Usually
international investment agreements clarify that expropriatory measures are lawful if
adopted: 1) "for a public purpose;" 2) "on a non-discriminatory basis;" 3) "in accordance
with due process of law;" and 4) "on payment of compensation." 8 4 A lack of any of these
requirements will imply that the expropriation is unlawful and thus requires
compensation.
In parallel, expropriation can be direct or indirect. Direct expropriation amounts to a
deprivation of property or a taking through formal transfer of title or outright seizure.
Cases of direct confiscation of foreign intellectual property rights have taken place in the
past. For example, during the First World War, gthe German-owned Bayer trademark
for aspirin [was] assigned to an unrelated U.S. company." 85 In the Norwegian Shipowners
case, an arbitral tribunal found that U.S. authorities had to pay compensation not only for
the requisition of all ships (tangible property) but also for the affected contract rights of
Norwegian ship owners (intangible property). 8 6 In German Interests in Polish Upper Sile-
sia, the Permanent Court of International Justice found that a Polish statute which trans-
ferred to the Polish Treasury all the properties of the German Reich located in the
territory annexed to Poland amounted to a taking not only of the Chorz6w factory but
also of certain patents that were affected by the legislation. 87 More recently, in Shell
Brand International AG v. Nicaragua,188 "two Shell subsidiaries filed a claim against the
Government of Nicaragua for breach of the Netherlands-Nicaragua BIT in response to
an alleged expropriation of their logo and brand name._h Reportedly, _g[a]ccording to
Shell, Nicaragua seized its trademarks in an effort to enforce a ... judgment handed down
in 2002 by a Nicaraguan court in, Sonia Eduarda Franco Franco, et al. v. Dow Chemical, et
al. h1 89 Accordingly, _g[t]hat judgment was in favour of some 500 Nicaraguan citizens
who claim to have been affected by the pesticide DBCP, which was manufactured for use
on banana plantations in the 1960s and 70s."1 90 As the case was withdrawn, very little
information is available about the case. 19 1
A more difficult question is whether regulatory measures that do not require the out-
right seizure of patents can nonetheless amount to a regulatory taking or indirect expro-
priation. Indirect expropriation indicates measures that do not directly take investment
183. Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Egypt, ICSID Case ARB/98/4, Award, [ 98 (Dec. 8, 2000) (noting that "expropri-
ation is not limited to tangible property rights").
184. Canada-Mexico-United States: North American Trade Agreement art. 1110.1, Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 605, 641.
185. Allen Z. Hertz, Shaping the Trident: Intellectual Property under NAFTA, Investment Protection Agreements
and at the World Trade Organization, 23 CAN.-U.S. LJ. 261, 276 (1997).
186. Norwegian Shipowners Claims (Nor. v. U.S.), 1 R.J.A.A 307, 323, 343 (1922); VADi, supra note 29, at
74.
187. Chorzow Factory Case (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.IJ. Series A No. 7 at 44 (May 25, 1926).
188. Shell Brands Int'l AG v. Nicaragua, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/14, Request for Arbitration (May 17,
2006).
189. Damon Vis-Dunbar, Shell Launches Claim Against Nicaragua over Seizure of Intellectual Property, Iv.
TREATY NEws, Oct. 13, 2006, available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/itnoct13_2006.pdf.
190. Id.
191. See Valentina Vadi, Trademark Protection, Public Health and International Investment Law: Strains and
Paradoxes, 20 EUR. J INT'L L. 773 (2009).
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property but which interfere with its use, depriving the owner of its economic benefit.1 92
For example, several studies have examined the question as to whether compulsory li-
censes (when a government allows someone else to exploit the patented product or process
without the consent of the patent owner) and parallel imports (importing and selling
branded goods into a market there without the consent of the owner of the trademark) can
amount to an expropriation of pharmaceutical patents.1 93 Both compulsory licenses and
parallel imports are flexibilities allowed by the TRIPS Agreement.1 94 The issue however,
remains theoretical as almost no claims have been brought concerning these specific issues
so far.195 While this does not preclude the possibility that such claims may be brought in
the future, this section explores how expropriation claims have been articulated in
practice.
In Servier and Others v. Poland, the tribunal held Poland liable for expropriation of phar-
maceutical marketing authorization in breach of the France-Poland bilateral investment
treaty.1 9 6 As part of Poland's accession to the European Union (EU), the country re-
viewed its pharmaceutical laws to harmonize them with EU standards.1 97 Under one of
these harmonization measures, medicines to be sold in Poland required a renewal of their
marketing authorization.1 98 In late 2008, Polish health authorities did not renew the au-
thorization for two medicines produced by the claimants.1 99 The precise reasons for de-
nial of the authorization are redacted from the published award. Around the same time,
authorization was granted to Polish companies to market alternatives to these
medicines. 2 00 Against this background, the claimants, three French pharmaceutical com-
panies, commenced UNCITRAL-rules arbitration under the France-Poland BIT; the
parties contended that the denial of authorizations amounted to a substantial deprivation
of value, and thus a direct or indirect expropriation of their pharmaceutical patents.20 1
Poland argued that its decisions not to renew marketing authorizations for the
medicines were adopted "in the normal course of [its] duties as pharmaceutical regulator,
and based on the drugs' failure to comply with EU law requirements." 202 According to
the respondent, these measures did not amount to an expropriation. 203 In particular,
Servier could not have expected that authorization would indefinitely be granted in the
context of both a heavily-regulated pharmaceutical industry and Poland's transition to EU
192. Brigitte Stern, In Search of the Frontiers ofIndirect Expropriation, in 1 CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTER-
NATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: FORDHAM PAPERS 35 (Arthur Rovine ed., 2007).
193. For an examination of the question as to whether compulsory licenses can amount to an indirect expro-
priation, see, e.g., VADI, supra note 29, at 52-53, 76-80, 88-91; Christopher S. Gibson, A Look at the Compul-
sory License in Investment Arbitration: The Case of Indirect Expropriation, 25 AM. U. INT'L L. Rrv. 357, 361-63
(2010); Carlos M. Correa, Investment Protection in Bilateral and Free Trade Agreements: Implications for the
Granting of Compulsory Licenses, 26 MICH. J. OF INT'L L. 331, 362, 367 (2004).
194. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 5, art.6 (parallel imports), art. 31 (compulsory licensing).
195. For discussion of an investment treaty arbitration concerning compulsory licensing, see VADI, spra
note 29, at 78.
196. Servier, Award, supra note 141, at ¶T 574-76.
197. Id. at ¶¶ 39-40.
198. Id. at ¶¶ 57-58.
199. Id. at ¶¶ 80, 89.
200. Id. at ¶¶ 108-110, 124.
201. Servier, Award, supra note 141, at T 215.
202. Id. at T 190.
203. Id.
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membership. 204 Moreover, Poland contended that its conduct complied with EU law,
which was binding on both Poland and France being the "product of a joint French and
Polish policy choice." 2 05 Poland argued that EU law constituted a "relevant rule of inter-
national law applicable between the parties" under Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties. 206 Therefore, according to Poland, it would be
"inappropriate to find that the regulatory requirements which both parties agreed to could
give rise to an obligation of compensation." 207
Poland contended that it denied marketing authorizations to certain medicines in the
exercise of its "police" powers to regulate public health.208 Poland argued that the display
of those powers was proportionate to the public interest to be protected and adopted in
good faith. 209 It urged arbitrators to show deference to state regulatory choices. 2 10 Po-
land also argued that its laws, recently harmonized with relevant EU law, would not have
allowed other regulatory choices, namely approval subject to further information, leaving
a denial as the only available response. 211 According to Poland, various delays were due to
the claimants' failure to provide information.212
While claimants did not contest the police powers doctrine per se, they contended that
the state measures were discriminatory, disproportionate, and unreasonable.213 According
to the claimants, the non-discrimination element was breached when authorizations were
granted to local producers while the claimants' applications were rejected. 2 14 Servier con-
tended that "neither the EU Treaty, nor the EU Pharmaceuticals Directive, require[d]
Poland to favour the local pharmaceutical industry and adopt measures to drive foreign
competitors from the market." 2 15 Servier argued that the host state aimed at "promot[ing]
the local pharmaceutical industry, in particular through the registration of low-cost local
generic products." 2 1 6 On proportionality, the claimants suggested that, rather than deny-
ing authorization, the health authorities could have limited the indications for use of the
medicines, or given conditional approval while requiring further information.2 1 7 Accord-
ing to the claimants, the authorities would allegedly deliberately deliver the decision to
deny renewal after the authorization had expired, which left the claimants with no re-
204. Id. at ¶¶ 271, 274.
205. Id. at T 264.
206. Id. at T 265 (citing Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(3)(c), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331).
207. Servier, Award, spra note 141, at T 265.
208. Id. at T 276.
209. Id. at T 403.
210. Id. at T 279 ("[]n assessing the measures, [the tribunal] 'should not embark upon an open-ended en-
quiry into the scientific correctness of the decisions in question or substitute its own regulatory choices for
those made by the competent Polish regulator.' Rather, the Tribunal should assess whether the measures
were 'motivated by honest belief, held in good faith and based on reasonable scientific grounds,' that is,
whether Poland acted as a reasonable regulator."); id. at T 282 ( "A deferential standard of review must be
employed by the Tribunal when it comes to regulatory decisions based around science and national
regulation.").
211. Servier, Award, spra note 141, at T 336.
212. Id. at T 347.
213. Id. at ¶¶ 276-77.
214. Id. at T 310.
215. Id. at T 264.
216. Id. at T 267.
217. Servier, Award, spra note 141, at T 344.
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course under Polish law.2 18 The claimants alleged that "no serious public health con-
cerns" justified the nonrenewal.219 In this regard, the claimants noted that while their
Eurespal syrup product was denied authorization, the same product in tablet form was
authorized. 220
The tribunal held that, while it should "accord due deference to the decisions of special-
ized Polish administrators interpreting and applying laws and regulations governing their
area of competence," it would "also consider the manner in which those decisions were
taken and their effect on the Claimants' investments." 221 The Tribunal found the denial
of marketing authorization to be discriminatory, disproportionate, and "not a matter of
public necessity," thus amounting to an unlawful expropriation of the investment. 222 Al-
though the Tribunal's reasoning on expropriation remains redacted from the award, the
specific outcome of this case may depend on the specific wording of the France-Poland
BIT, providing that "any" divestment would "give rise to payment of 'prompt and ade-
quate compensation' corresponding to the 'real value' of the divested investments." 223
In another recent dispute, the U.S.-based pharmaceutical company, Eli Lilly, filed a
Notice of Intent against the Government of Canada pursuant to NAFTA Chapter 11,224
claiming that the invalidation of some of its patents by Canadian courts amounted to
expropriation. 225 The claimant contends that such judicial decisions deprived the invest-
ments of any substantial value and were contrary to the host state's international treaty
obligations. 226 First, the claimant argues that the revocation of the patent constitutes a
direct expropriation as:
The effect of the promise doctrine and other measures was to revoke the patents ab
initio, thereby depriving Lilly of its exclusive rights to prevent third parties from mak-
ing, constructing, using, or selling its patented products during the patent term and
to enforce those rights during the patent term or thereafter.227
Conversely, the company claims that the host state action amounted to indirect expro-
priation as "[tlhe measures in issue have had the effect of destroying the value associated
with Lilly's investments." 228 The company is seeking US$500 million in damages. 229
The facts of the case are the following: the Canadian Federal Court invalidated the
Strattera patent, a treatment of attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), upon the
request of a generic pharmaceutical company in 2010-six years prior to the patent's
218. Id. at T 342.
219. Id. at T 352.
220. Id.
221. Id. at T 568.
222. Id. at T 575.
223. Servier, Award, spra note 141, at T 643.
224. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Notice of Intent, 1 (Nov. 7,2012) available
at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italawll72.pdf.
225. Id. at ¶¶ 89-97.
226. Id. at ¶¶ 91, 94.
227. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Notice of Arbitration, T 75 (Sept. 12, 2013),
available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italawl582.pdf.
228. Id.
229. See Okediji spra note 77, at 1121 (highlighting that "the firm seeks to compel a change in Canadian
patent law, an intervention by the Parliament to limit the interpretation of the utility requirement by
judges").
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scheduled expiration-due to its perceived "inutility."23 0 The claimant alleges that it has
suffered damages as a result of the invalidation of its patent.2 3' Since the declaration of
invalidity, the company "no longer had the exclusive right to make, use and sell its pat-
ented" medicine. 232 According to the claimant, Canada's federal courts have developed a
doctrine which diverges from patent law in other jurisdictions and which has had the
effect of invalidating a large number of patents in recent years. 233 In particular, the com-
pany complains that Canadian courts are requiring not only that a given invention have
some "scintilla" of usefulness, but also that patent-holders prove, with evidence, that the
invention has lived up to the usefulness promised by the patent holder at the time of seek-
ing the patent.2 34 If the patented invention is found not to meet this promise, the patent
can be revoked. 23 5 According to the claimant, not only would the promise doctrine "un-
duly impede research and development," 236 but it would also breach Canada's obligations
under several intellectual property conventions, including Article 27 of the TRIPS Agree-
ment,237 NAFTA Chapter 17 and the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) "by imposing
onerous and additional utility requirements that have had the effect of denying patent
rights for inventions which meet the conditions precedent to patentability."238
In its Statement of Defence [sic], Canada countered that a direct expropriation only
occurs when rights are taken by the state and that no such transfer occurred in this case. 239
Rather, Lilly's patents were invalidated.240 Canada argued that "[w]here a court of com-
petent jurisdiction . . . determines that a presumed property right is legally invalid (i.e. that
it does not exist), this does not amount to a 'taking', but rather, constitutes juridical deter-
mination of the existence and scope of rights at law." 24 1 In other words, according to
Canada, the company cannot claim its investments were expropriated because its patents
do not even exist under Canadian law.242 Canada also noted that "[p]atent grants are
invalidated each year by courts in all major jurisdictions," if challenged by other parties
and determined by a court not to meet the conditions for patent protection.2 43 Therefore,
according to Canada, "Article 1110 does not apply to the procedurally fair invalidation of
230. Eli Lilly & Co., Notice of Intent, supra note 224, at ¶T 73, 74, 90.
231. Id. at T 90.
232. Id.
233. Id. at ¶¶ 37, 38.
234. Id.
235. Id. at T 42.
236. Eli Lilly & Co., Notice of Intent, supra note 224, at T 16.
237. Id. at T 6.
238. Id. at T 42.




242. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Canada Counter Memorial, T 302 (Jan. 27,
2015), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4l31.pdf (adding that domestic law is
the law that determines the existence and nature of property rights and stating that "[i]f there is no valid
property right at domestic law, then there is nothing that can be 'taken' within the meaning of the interna-
tional law of expropriation. The only context in which a domestic court ruling on the validity of an asserted
property right could amount to an expropriation is if there has been a denial of justice").
243. Eli Lilly & Co., Canada Statement of Defence, supra note 239, at ¶ 106.
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a patent by a domestic court." 2 44 Moreover, Canada stressed that "[investment tribunals]
do not sit as courts of appeal of domestic legal determinations." 2 45
Additionally, Canada argues that there can be no expropriation because Canada's ac-
tions were consistent with NAFTA Chapter 17.246 According to Article 1110(7) of
NAFTA, measures invalidating patents cannot give rise to expropriation claims under
Chapter 11 if those measures are consistent with Chapter 17.247 Canada highlights that,
like the TRIPS Agreement, NAFTA Chapter 17 leaves each state party with significant
latitude to define the substantive scope of patent protection. 248
In its Counter-memorial, Canada also highlights the public policy dimension of phar-
maceutical patent regulation.249 According to Canada, the "patent bargain" encompasses
a balance between the patent owner and the public:
These rules are intended to ensure that patentees provide the consideration they
promised in exchange for the grant of a 20-year monopoly. They seek to ensure that
patents are filed on the basis of true invention, rather than of speculation. They
verify that disclosure obligations in the patent, which is the basis for the 'patent bar-
gain' with the public, are fulfilled. These rules are fundamental to the integrity of the
patent system. 250
Therefore, according to Canada, "such rules in the administration of its domestic patent
system" are "legitimate and lawful." 251
Canadian commentators argue that there is no such thing as a separate "promise doc-
trine" in Canadian patent law; rather, these cases relate to the utility test-one of the
internationally mandated requirements (with novelty and non-obviousness) under which
patents are granted for inventions. 252 In other words, "[a]ll states require that patents be
issued only for 'useful' inventions." 25 3 Canadian scholars point out that enforcing a paten-
tee's promise contained within a patent specification serves three goals: "(1) holding pat-
entees to account for the public benefit they promise in exchange for the patent
monopoly; (2) ensuring that the patentee actually has conducted enough research and
development to understand and communicate how the invention works in all its claimed
instantiations; and (3) preventing double patenting." 254 In other words, "the patent sys-
244. Id.
245. Id. at T 112.
246. Eli Lilly & Co., Canada Counter Memorial, supra note 242, at T 344.
247. Id.
248. Id. at T 362 ("In the international context, relevant international organizations and States have recog-
nized that neither 'utility' not 'industrial applicability' are harmonized terms, and instead bear a range of
distinct technical meanings in various national patent law systems."); id. at T 365 (highlighting the NAFTA
Parties' "intention to leave these terms to be applied in a flexible and principled manner, in accordance with
national law").
249. Id. at T 7.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. E. Richard Gold & Michael Shortt, The Promise of the Patent in Canada and Around the World, 30 CAN.
INTELL. PROP. Rv. 37, 37-39 (2014) (noting that "the 'promise of the patent' is probably the most contro-
versial issue in contemporary Canadian patent law" but suggesting that the legal concept has "deep historical
roots and global reach" and "is not ... an independent legal rule").
253. Id. at 37.
254. Id. at 40.
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tem is based on a "bargain" or quid pro quo: the inventor is granted exclusive rights in a
new and useful invention for a limited period in exchange for disclosure of the invention
so that society can benefit from this knowledge."255
Turning to the indirect expropriation claim, with regard to the economic impact of the
patent invalidation, Canada argues that the invalidated patents were just one component
of Lilly's overall business in Canada. 25 6 In fact, the company continues to grow and sells a
number of products.25 7 Therefore, according to Canada, there was no substantial or total
destruction of the claimant's investments. 25 8 With regard to the character of the invalida-
tion, Canada emphasizes that the decisions of its courts were legitimate.259 The defendant
also highlighted that the "whole notion of judicial expropriation is entirely unsettled even
in domestic legal systems, let alone in customary international law."260 As the case is
pending, it is not possible to foresee how it will be decided.
In Apotex Inc. v. United States, Apotex, a Canadian generic pharmaceutical company,
alleged, inter alia, expropriation of its investments.2 61 According to the claimant, the Fed-
eral Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and subsequent amendments provide for "an abbrevi-
ated approval process that enables generic pharmaceutical manufacturers to obtain
regulatory approval of lower-priced generic versions of previously-approved [medicines]
on an expedited basis, thereby benefiting the U.S. health-care system and American con-
sumers."
2 62 In 2003, the company filed an application with the U.S. Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) to obtain the approval of a generic version of an antidepressant before
the relevant patent owned by Pfizer expired in 2006.263 In doing so, Apotex triggered an
"artificial" act of patent infringement in an effort to draw the patent owner into a dispute
that would provide a judgment, one way or the other, on the legality of Apotex's applica-
tion to sell the medicine. 264 When the patent holder declined to file a suit, Apotex filed
for a declaratory judgment that it was not infringing on the patent, which, according to
the claimant, is a common legal tactic in patent litigation. 265 But the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Apotex's suit for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction as it lacked a "reasonable apprehension" that Pfizer would
launch a suit for patent infringement.266 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, and the Supreme Court denied
Apotex's petition for certiorari.2 67 In its Notice of Arbitration, Apotex argues that the U.S.
courts "misapplied statutory and constitutional law," as their reliance on the so-called
prudential jurisdictional doctrine or reasonable apprehension doctrine would be contrary
255. Id. at 42.
256. Eli Lilly & Co., Canada Counter Memorial, supra note 242, at T 409.
257. Id. at 411.
258. Id. at 415.
259. Id. at 414.
260. Id.
261. Apotex Inc. v. United States (Apotex 1), UNCITRAL, Notice of Arbitration, T 7 (Dec. 10, 2008), availa-
ble at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italawl323.pdf.
262. Id. at T 29.
263. Id. at ¶¶ 14, 16.
264. Id. at ¶¶ 16-17.
265. Id. at T 19.
266. Id. at ¶¶ 20, 36; see generally Apotex Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 385 F.Supp.2d 187 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
267. Apotex I, Notice of Arbitration, supra note 261, at T 20; see Apotex Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 159 Fed.Appx.
1013 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 970 (2006).
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to the U.S. Constitution and Supreme Court jurisprudence.2 68 According to the claimant,
such a doctrine creates a sort of bottleneck, delaying the expeditious development and
manufacture of generics, and thus is contrary to public welfare.269
Against this background, Apotex contended that the United States' conduct amounted
to an unlawful expropriation, thus violating NAFTA Article 1110.270 The claimant argued
that "[u]nder international law, expropriation occurs where government action unreasona-
bly interferes with an alien's effective use or enjoyment of property." 27 1 According to the
claimant, the U.S. interfered with its property rights in its "abbreviated new drug applica-
tion" (ANDA) "by unlawfully preventing Apotex from obtaining a federal court decision"
assessing the validity of the relevant patent, and "substantially depriving Apotex of the
benefits of its investments." 2 72 The claimant also argued that the defendant "[had] no
'public purpose' for interfering with Apotex's property rights," 27 3 and it "failed to provide
[the company] with due process of law." 274 Finally, Apotex claimed that it did not receive
compensation for the damages it alleged to have suffered. 275 The Arbitral Tribunal dis-
missed all of the claims and ordered Apotex to pay the United States' legal fees and arbi-
tral expenses. 276
A parallel dispute, 277 which was joined to the former and heard by the same Arbitral
Tribunal,278 involved the submission of a medicine application seeking approval for a ge-
neric version of a heart medication, Pravachol@.279 In order to obtain approval of its
application, Apotex had sued the patent owner, Bristol Myers Squibb (BMS), to obtain a
guarantee that it would not file a claim for patent infringement after the launch of Apotex
medicines on the market.2 80 In response, "BMS moved to dismiss for lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction on the ground that it had no intention of suing Apotex for infringe-
ment." 281 The Court dismissed Apotex's declaratory judgment action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. 28 2 According to the claimant, the administrative decision of the FDA,
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, each violated U.S. statutory law and prior controlling prece-
dent.2 83 According to Apotex, the United States breached, inter alia, NAFTA Article 1110
268. Apotex I, Notice of Arbitration, supra note 261, at T 56.
269. Id. at ¶¶ 45, 56.
270. Id. at T 67.
271. Id. at T 65.
272. Id. at T 67.
273. Id. at T 68.
274. Apotex I, Notice of Arbitration, supra note 261, at T 69.
275. Id. at T 70.
276. Apotex I & II, Award on jurisdiction and Admissibility, spra note 173, at T 358.
277. See generally Apotex Inc. v. United States (Apotex II), UNCITRAL, Notice of Arbitration (June 4,
2009), available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italawl229.pdf
278. Although there were two different statements of claims, the parties agreed that the tribunal would hear
the two claims concurrently, but not consolidated. See Apotex Inc. v. United States, UNCITRAL, Procedu-
ral Order No. 1, at T 1 (Dec. 16, 2010), available athttp://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
ita0032_0.pdf. Therefore, there was only one award dealing with the two different claims. See Apotex I & II,
Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, spra note 173, at T 4.
279. Apotex II, spra note 277, at T 14-15.
280. Id. at T 21.
281. Id.
282. Id. at T 22.
283. Id. at T 31.
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("Expropriation and Compensation").2 8 4 In its claim, Apotex again alleged that the state
action interfered with its property rights in its medicine application.285 According to the
claimant, "[e]xpropriation can occur where the State itself acquires nothing of value, but
'at least has been the instrument of redistribution.'" 2 86 Apotex further claimed that be-
cause the United States had no "public purpose" for interfering with its property rights
and did not provide compensation, 28 7 the company was entitled to compensatory dam-
ages. 288 The Arbitral Tribunal dismissed both claims on jurisdiction because of the failure
to exhaust local remedies, 289 time limits,290 and lack of investment. 291
In conclusion, there is no "mechanical formula" for determining whether state conduct
can amount to a direct or indirect expropriation. 292 Nonetheless, "expropriation requires
that there be a 'substantial deprivation' to the investor." 293 The character and regulatory
purpose behind the government regulation can carry weight in the assessment as to
whether there was a legitimate exercise of the state police powers. 294 As noted by Gibson,
"[t]he invalidation or revocation of a patent results in an extreme deprivation of the inves-
tor's Ip."295 But the act of invalidation or revocation "may constitute a legitimate regula-
tory activity." 296
C. AMouNT OF COMPENSATION
A further issue that arises in case any breach of the BIT is found is the determination of
the amount of compensation. In particular, a specific type of claim concerns the amount
of compensation to be paid after an expropriation has taken place. Expropriation rules
may be more beneficial to the patent owner than the patent rules. Customary compensa-
tion rules, uniformly enshrined in investment protection treaties, do not differentiate be-
tween the various public purposes of expropriations, posing a single standard instead. Full
compensation is often described as having the characteristics of promptness, adequacy,
and effectiveness according to the so-called Hull formula.297
In Servier and Others v. Poland, the case concerning the alleged expropriation of
Servier's investments, the France-Poland BIT required that any expropriation would
"give rise to prompt and adequate compensation" at the "real value of the investment." 298
284. Id. at T 77.
285. Apotex II, spra note 277, at T 277.
286. Id. at T 76.
287. Id. at ¶¶ 78-80.
288. Id.
289. Apotex I & II, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, supra note 173, at ¶¶ 298-99.
290. Id. at T 324.
291. Id. at ¶¶ 243, 246.
292. Gibson, supra note 72, at 450.
293. Id. at 451-52.
294. Id. at 452.
295. Id. at 453.
296. Id. at 454.
297. The Hull formula is named after the American Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, who described a full
compensation standard as "prompt, adequate and effective" in a diplomatic exchange of notes with Mexico in
1930. Frank G. Dawson & Burns H. Weston, "Prompt, Adequate and Effective": A Universal Standard of Com-
pensation?, 30 FORDHAM L. REv. 727, 733-34 (1962), available at http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcon
tent.cgi?article=1730&context=flr.
298. Servier, Award, supra note 141, at ¶T 6, 37.
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Therefore, the Tribunal held that this compensation standard was to be applied, regardless
of whether the expropriation was lawful or unlawful.299 Noting that each side won on
some points and lost on others, 30 0 the Arbitral Tribunal split the costs equally, with parties
left to bear their own legal fees.301 However, not only is the reasoning on valuation of the
damages awarded to the claimant redacted, but the claimant's arguments on valuation,
including the amount that it sought, are also redacted. 30 2 The Tribunal stated that it had
"discretion to impose additional sanctions to punish Treaty violations of particular seri-
ousness, such as discrimination or breach of specific undertakings." 303 However, the tri-
bunal found that Poland had "not engaged in bad faith behaviour ... that would require
damages beyond the Treaty standard." 304
D. FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT
Fair and equitable treatment (FET) has become the most often invoked provision in
investment treaty arbitration. Due to its vagueness, it ensures that "even where there is no
clear justification for making a finding of expropriation," or any other breach of other
investment treaty standards, "there is still a standard which serves the purpose of jus-
tice." 30 The fair and equitable treatment standard is an absolute standard of treatment.
Absolute standards of treatment are designed to provide a basic safeguard upon which the
investor can rely at any time, as opposed to the "relative" standards embodied in "national
treatment" and in the "most favored nation" principles, which, on the other hand, define
the required treatment by reference to the treatment accorded to other investments. In an
attempt to delimit the perimeters of the standard, in the NAFTA context, the Free Trade
Commission issued an interpretation of the provision, 306 which is binding on the NAFTA
tribunals.307 The Commission clarified that the FET provision under NAFTA Article
1105 prescribes the minimum standard of treatment in customary international law and
does not require any standard of treatment that goes beyond that. Traditionally, the mini-
mum standard of treatment protected investors only in instances of "egregious and shock-
ing" or "manifestly unfair or inequitable conduct." Outside the NAFTA context,
however, arbitral tribunals have broadened the notion of fair and equitable treatment sig-
nificantly. Despite some persisting vagueness, the standard is said to go beyond the mini-
mum standard of treatment and to comprise various elements such as transparency, due
process, legitimate expectations, and others. 308 The protection of legitimate expectations
299. Id. at T 644.
300. Id. at T 669.
301. Id. at T 672.
302. See id. at T 646-62.
303. Servier, Award, supra note 141, at 645.
304. Id. at T 642.
305. Id.; Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award T 300 (Sept. 28,
2007), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0770.pdf
306. NAFTA Free Trade Comm'n, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions (July 31,
2001).
307. NAFTA, supra note 74, art. 1131 ("An interpretation by the [FTC] of a provision of the Agreement
shall be binding on a Tribunal established under this Section.").
308. Christoph Schreuer, Fair and Equitable Treatment in Arbitral Practice, 6 J. OF WORLD INVESTMENT &
TRADE 357, 386 (2005), available at http://www.urnivie.ac.at/intlaw/pdf/77.pdf.
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is not absolute; rather, it must be balanced against the state right to regulate in the public
interest. 309
With regard to claims concerning alleged violations of fair and equitable treatment, it is
worth recalling the NAFTA case Signa S.A. v. Canada.31 0 Signa, a Mexican generic phar-
maceutical company, established a joint venture with the Canadian Apotex, Inc., for the
production of the generic version of Bayer Inc.'s top-selling ciprofloxacin hydrochloride,
an antibiotic that treats a number of bacterial infections.311 In order to sell the pharma-
ceutical in Canada, an authorization was required by the relevant authorities. 3 12 Signa
contended that the regulations governing the authorization process included "improper
requirements." 3 13 According to the claimant, the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance)
Regulations provided that "by merely purporting to have a relevant patent, a person can
obtain a mandatory prohibition against a generic competitor for a period of about 3
years." 3 14 As Bayer, the patent holder company, prevented Apotex and Signa from using
ciprofloxacin hydrochloride for a period of about three years, Signa claimed loss of reve-
nues and market share.3 15 Signa, inter alia, claimed that the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations constituted a breach of Article 1105 of the NAFTA, which pro-
vides for the fair and equitable treatment of foreign investors.316 As the parties quickly
settled this case, there is no publicly available information on the dispute. This with-
drawal was probably due to the inception of the TRIPS Agreement that extended the
pharmaceutical patent protection to twenty years. Whether the filing of the Notice of
Intent to Arbitrate had any strategic or other impact is unknown.
In Eli Lilly v. Canada, the case relating to the invalidation of patents for treatments used
for attention deficit disorder and schizophrenia, the claimant contends that the allegedly
unexpected and arbitrary adoption by the Canadian courts of a new, stricter approach to
patent invalidation is contrary to the company's "reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions," 317 and in breach of NAFTA Article 1105 which sets out a minimum standard of
treatment owed to foreign investors.3 18 The company argues that it "could not have an-
ticipated that the requirement for utility at the time of its investment . . . would be so
drastically altered by the adoption . . . of the doctrine of the 'promise of the patent"' into
Canadian law and practice. 319 The claimant also contends that by allegedly violating a
number of international law instruments governing patentability requirements, the Cana-
309. Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, T 305
(Mar. 17, 2006).("No investor may reasonably expect that the circumstances prevailing at the time the invest-
ment is made remain totally unchanged. In order to determine whether frustration of the foreign investor's
expectations was justified or reasonable, the host State's legitimate right subsequently to regulate domestic
matters in the public interest must be taken into consideration as well.").
310. Signa S.A. de CV. v. Canada, Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under Section B of
Chapter 22 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (Mar. 4, 1996), available at http://www.interna-
tional.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff/signa-01.pdf.
311. Id. at paras. 1-3.
312. Id. at para. 4.
313. Id.
314. Id. at para. 6.
315. Id. at para. 9.
316. Signa S.A., spra note 310, at para. 12.
317. See Eli Lilly & Co., Notice of Intent, supra note 224, at ¶T 49, 70, 99-102.
318. Id. at T 98.
319. Id. at T 101.
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dian measures are in breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard. 32 0 The company
stresses its legitimate expectations that Canada complies with international IP norms,32 1
including the TRIPS Agreement, the Patent Cooperation Treaty and NAFTA Chapter
17.322
In its Statement of Defence, the Government of Canada counter-argues that the claim-
ant received due process before Canadian courts and that the mere fact that the claimant
was disappointed with the outcomes of two patent trials does not amount to a breach of
the relevant obligations. 323 Canada stresses that "NAFTA tribunals are not courts of ap-
peal for disappointed domestic litigants."324 Rather, according to the respondent, "[t]he
threshold for a violation by a court of the Minimum Standard of Treatment" is set "ex-
tremely high" under customary international law.325 Canada highlights that the FET
standard does not prevent the evolution of a State's legal framework326 as NAFTA Chap-
ter 11 was "never meant 'as a kind of insurance policy against the risk of any changes in
the host State's legal and economic framework'." 327 In its Counter Memorial, Canada
also points out that NAFTA's FET provision does not go beyond the minimum standard
of treatment required under customary international law.328 According to Canada, "a vio-
lation of Article 1105(1) will not be found unless there is evidence of serious malfeasance,
manifestly arbitrary behavior or denial of justice by the respondent NAFTA Party." 329
Therefore, Canada argues that a violation of investors' legitimate expectations does not
establish a breach of the minimum standard of treatment, as the theory of legitimate ex-
pectations has not become a rule of customary international law.330
The respondent also maintains that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction "over alleged
breaches of Canada's international intellectual property obligations."331 In particular, the
respondent highlights that the Tribunal "lacks jurisdiction to rule on alleged violations of
any of TRIPS, PCT or NAFTA Chapter Seventeen" and that enforcement of obligations
under these other international IP agreements may only be brought before other
venues.
332
320. Id. at ¶¶ 93, 99.
321. Id. at T 93.
322. Id. at ¶¶ 93, 96.
323. Eli Lilly & Co., Canada Statement of Defence, supra note 239, at T 90.
324. See id. at ¶ 98.
325. Id. at T 99.
326. Id. at T 104.
327. Id. (quoting EDF (Services) Ltd. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, Award, T 217 (Oct. 8,
2009)).
328. See Eli Lilly & Co., Canada Counter Memorial, supra note 242, at T 15.
329. Id. at T 227.
330. Id. at T 266.
331. Eli Lilly & Co., Canada Statement of Defence, spra note 239, at ¶¶ 83-84 ("The Tribunal's jurisdiction
in this matter relates only to alleged breaches of NAFTA Chapter Eleven obligations. Chapter Eleven does
not grant this Tribunal jurisdiction 'at large' to rule on alleged breaches of any and all of Canada's other
international obligations.").
332. Id. at T 84 ("Disputes in respect of an alleged breach of TRIPS obligations may only be brought pursu-
ant to the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the World Trade Organisation. Allegations of a breach of
the PCT are, in accordance with that Treaty, to be brought before the International Court ofJustice. Allega-
tions of a breach of NAFTA Chapter Seventeen are to be brought on a State-to-State basis before a tribunal
constituted pursuant to NAFTA Chapter Twenty.").
FALL 2015
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
182 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
In any case, Canada also stresses that it is in compliance with NAFTA Chapter 17.333 In
fact, according to the respondent, "the language of NAFTA Article 1709(1) was drawn
from the TRIPS negotiations, where broad terms were used due to the lack of consensus
on substantive law and the desire to maintain flexibility."334 Due to "substantial differ-
ences in their respective intellectual property regimes . . . the NAFTA Parties were unable
to agree even on common terminology for core concepts of patentability." 335 While Arti-
cle 1709(1) includes the criteria "new," "result[ing] from an inventive step," and "capable
of industrial application" as criteria for patentability of a given compound, it also notes
that "a Party may deem the terms 'inventive step' and 'capable of industrial application' to
be synonymous with the terms 'non-obvious' and 'useful,' respectively."336 According to
Canada, the TRIPS Agreement reinforces this line of argument, as it "did not attempt to
create a uniform or deeply harmonized patent regime and left ample room for national
variations and approaches to substantive patent issues."3 3 7 Finally, the state notes the ir-
relevance of the PCT to the case. In fact, according to the state, "[tlhe PCT expressly
does not govern either substantive conditions of patentability or the invalidation of pat-
ents." 338 It "simply facilitates the international filing of patent applications."339 Yet, Ca-
nada stresses that "[fWiling in accordance with the PCT is no guarantee that a patent
application will result in a successful patent grant, or that any grant of a patent will with-
stand judicial scrutiny." 340
In Apotex v. United States (Apotex I and II), the disputes concerning the approval for
generic versions of given antidepressant and anti-cholesterol medicines, the claimant de-
scribed the courts' judgments as a "substantive 'denial of justice'" in violation of NAFTA
Article 1105, in addition to contending that they were "unjust" and amounted to an expro-
priation of its investment.3 4 1 In particular, the claimant contended that it was denied jus-
tice when U.S. courts "render[ed] manifestly unjust decisions by misapplying
constitutional, statutory, and common law relevant to the justiciability of declaratory judg-
ment actions" brought by the generics company against the patent-owner. 342 The com-
pany claimed that there was a breach of the minimum standard of treatment required by
NAFTA Article 1105.343 The claim of denial of justice was brought in conjunction with
the claim for expropriation that was examined above. 34 4 Under customary international
law, and under certain circumstances, a manifestly unjust judgment may constitute a "de-
nial[ ] of justice," 345 or a type of indirect expropriation. 346
333. Id. at T 82.
334. Id. at T 87.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Eli Lilly & Co., Canada Statement of Defence, supra note 239, at T 91.
338. Id. at ¶¶ 93-94.
339. Id. at T 94.
340. Id.
341. See Apotex I, Notice of Arbitration, supra note 261, at ¶T 13-14, 61-67.
342. Id. at T 63.
343. Id. at ¶¶ 61, 61.
344. Id. at ¶¶ 64, 67.
345. See Loewen Grp. Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award, T 129, (June 26, 2003)
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/22094.pdf.
346. See Saipem S.p.A. v. Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, Award, T 127 (June 30, 2009) http://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0734.pdf.
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As mentioned above, the Arbitral Tribunal upheld all preliminary objections raised by
the United States of America, including that the claimant had not made a covered invest-
ment in the U.S., and that it had failed to exhaust local remedies that were available and
not obviously futile.347 In particular, the respondent noted that "[w]ith respect to its Ser-
traline Claim, Apotex sought, and was denied, review from the U.S. Supreme Court with
regard to the lower court decisions rejecting its declaratory judgment action."3 48 There-
fore, with regard to this claim, "[a]ll avenues of recourse within the U.S. court system
were thereby exhausted." 34 9 However, it noted that "[w]ith respect to its Pravastatin
Claim . . . Apotex elected not to pursue all potentially available avenues before the U.S.
Courts. In particular, it did not seek U.S. Supreme Court review of the court decisions
rejecting its efforts to enjoin application of the FDA decision." 3 0 Both parties agreed that
"'judicial finality' must first be reached in the host State's domestic courts, unless such
recourse is 'obviously futile.'" 3 1 But they disagreed on the meaning of "obviously fu-
tile."352 Apotex submitted that "it [was] wholly unrealistic to suppose that the Supreme
Court would not only have granted the petition, but could have scheduled argument and
render an opinion in Apotex's favour. . . . Any efforts to achieve such a result would have
been 'objectively futile.'"'33
After stating that this objection concerned its jurisdiction ratione mateiae,354 the Tribu-
nal concluded that the judicial acts complained of lacked sufficient finality to form the
basis of claims under NAFTA Chapter Eleven.35 5 It expressed "sympathy for Apotex's
position", and appreciated that "petitioning the U.S. Supreme Court was unlikely to se-
cure the desired relief."356 However, it held that "under established principles, the ques-
tion whether the failure to obtain judicial finality may be excused for 'obvious futility'
turns on the unavailability of relief by a higher judicial authority, not on measuring the
likelihood that the higher judicial authority would have granted the desired relief." 357
The national court system-explained the Tribunal-must be given a chance to correct
errors before its perceived failings can constitute an international wrong.35 8
In Apotex III, concerning the import ban on certain pharmaceuticals produced in Ca-
nada, the claimant contended that the U.S. had breached the minimum standard of treat-
ment due to the perceived lack of due process in issuing the issue alert, and delays
experienced in reinspecting the facilities. The claimant also contended that the FET stan-
dard is an evolving standard and includes due process in administrative decision-making
processes. 35 9 In its counter-memorial, 360 the U.S. countered that the import alert was a
347. Apotex I & II, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, spra note 173, at T 135.
348. Id. at T 249.
349. Id..
350. Id. at T 250.
351. Id. at T 257.
352. Id.
353. Apotex I & II, Award on jurisdiction and Admissibility, spra note 173, at T 274.
354. Id. at T 260.
355. Id. at T 267.
356. Id. at T 276.
357. Id.
358. Id. at ¶¶ 281-282.
359. Apotex III, Award, supra note 165, at T 2.26.
360. Apotex III, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/1, U.S. Counter-Memorial (Dec. 14, 2012), available at http://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italawl242.pdf.
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lawful measure to prevent the import of adulterated medicines and ensure the safety of
imported products in an increasingly globalized world. The U.S. also argued that domes-
tic agencies such as the FDA are given discretion with regard to enforcement action be-
cause of its specialized expertise. The Tribunal noted that "[w]hen interpreting and
applying the 'minimum standard', a Chapter 11 tribunal does not have an open-ended
mandate to second-guess government decision making."361 But, while the Tribunal dis-
missed some claims on jurisdictional grounds, it did not find any breach of the substantive
obligations of NAFTA Chapter 11.362
IP-related FET claims have raised a number of questions: does the grant of the patent
by the host state constitute state representations which in turn create legitimate expecta-
tions the patent holder may rely upon? 36 3 Can an investor rely upon international intel-
lectual property norms as a source of legitimate expectations? 36 4 Does investment treaty
arbitration provide new means to enforce international intellectual property agree-
ments? 36 What is the relationship between denial of justice claims and claims of judicial
indirect expropriation? 36 6 The next subsections will address these questions.
1. IP Rights as a Basis for Investor's Legitimate Expectations?
The grant of a patent does not confer absolute rights. 367 As Grosse Ruse-Khan points
out, such conferral "certainly does not and cannot create any legitimate expectation that
the exclusivity it confers is absolute and will remain without interference from accepted
checks and balances inherent in the IP system." 368 Not only does the international IP
framework provide for commonly used regulatory controls on the utilization and exploita-
tion of patents, and such tools should not be considered as a breach of FET, but patents
are territorial in nature.369 Therefore, it is within a host state's competence to determine
the patentability and scope of protection offered for patents granted pursuant to national
law. Patents exist by virtue of legal recognition from the state. Moreover, intellectual
property rights are not positive rights; rather they are negative rights, which prevent other
competitors from exploiting a given invention for a limited time. They cannot prevent
the states from regulating the use of such rights in the pursuit of legitimate public policy
objectives. 370 Vice versa, if the host state had granted specific assurances to the investor
361. Apotex III., Award, spra note 165, at T 9.39.
362. Id. at T 9.72.
363. Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Litigating Intellectual Property Rights in Investor-State Arbitration: From
Plain Packaging to Patent Revocation 3 (Max Plank Inst. for Intellectual Prop. & Competition Law, Working
Paper No. 2014/21), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2463711.
364. Id.
365. See Gibson, supra note 72, at 397.
366. Id.
367. See Ruse-Khan, supra note 363, at 13.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 13-14 (referring to Panel Report, European Communities - Protection of Trademarks and Geographical
Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, VTO Doc. WT/DS/174R (adopted Mar. 15, 2005) [here-
inafter EC- Geographical Indications Panel Report]).
370. EC-Geographical Indications Panel Report, supra note 367, at ¶¶ 7.210, 7.246.
[T]he TRIPS Agreement does not generally provide for the grant of positive rights to exploit or
use certain subject matter, but rather provides for the grant of negative rights to prevent certain
acts. This fundamental feature of intellectual property protection inherently grants Members
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regarding the exploitation of her investment in the host state, the adoption of new regula-
tory measures affecting the economic value of her investment might amount to a breach of
fair and equitable treatment. 37 '
2. International IP Norms as a Source of Legitimate Expectations?
In several investment arbitrations, investors claim that measures adopted by the host state
and affecting their investments are illegal under a number of international IP agreements
and therefore violate the fair and equitable treatment standard. They allege that as the
host state is a party to international intellectual property agreements such as the TRIPS
Agreement, the Paris Convention and the Patent Cooperation Treaty, they expect that the
host state will not violate such agreements. For instance, Eli Lilly argues that "[t]he Gov-
ernment of Canada has a positive obligation to ensure Canadian law complies with Ca-
nada's international treaty obligations, as well as the reasonable investment-backed
expectations of the investor." 372 Can investors legitimately expect that the host state com-
plies with its international obligations? Or are these claims plainly outside the scope of
protection of international investment treaties?
In Eli Lilly v. Canada, while the claimant contended that the possible violation of the
TRIPS provisions constitutes a violation of the FET standard, the respondent argued that
the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction over the question as to whether the host state complied
with its obligations under international IP treaties. 37 3 As Grosse Ruse-Khan points out,
"[w]ithout any explicit reference to such treaty obligations in an IIA, it appears difficult to
assume that the IA parties wished to interpret the FET standard in such a wide-ranging
manner."
3 74 In fact had the IIA parties wished to expand the subject matter jurisdiction of
the Tribunal, arguably they would have included explicit reference to other international
treaties. In addition, if the Arbitral Tribunal accepted such an extensive interpretation of
the FET standard, there would be a conflict or overlap between the jurisdiction of the
same Tribunal and other international courts, as the same dispute or related aspects of the
same could be brought to two different dispute settlement systems. But the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism has exclusive jurisdiction in settling disputes over breaches of
VTO law.375
In any case, Canada also discusses the substantive provisions of the TRIPS Agreement,
NAFTA Chapter 17 and the PCT to show that, in any event, it is in compliance with such
instruments.37 6 The key issue here is that international intellectual property treaties "in-
clude deliberate gaps, reflecting areas of non-convergence and the residual sovereignty of
states to legislate specific rules."377 How countries achieve a competitive balance between
public and private interests remains a national prerogative, provided that they comply with
freedom to pursue legitimate public policy objectives since many measures to attain those public
policy objectives lie outside the scope of intellectual property rights and do not require an excep-
tion under the TRIPS Agreement.
371. Ruse-Khan, supra note 363, at 14.
372. Eli Lilly & Co., Notice of Intent, supra note 224, at T 95.
373. Eli Lilly & Co., Canada Statement of Defence, supra note 239, at T 82.
374. Ruse-Khan, supra note 363, at 15.
375. DSU, spra note 116, Annex 2, art. 23.
376. Eli Lilly & Co., Canada Statement of Defence, supra note 239, at TT 86-94.
377. Okediji, spra note 77, at 1132.
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their international obligations.37 8 Yet, "it is well recognized that domestic implementation
of international intellectual property standards will take distinctive twists across coun-
tries." 379 As Okediji points out, "[o]ften countries calibrate across patentability standards
to achieve net policy goals in specific sectors. The ultimate question is whether the inven-
tor has provided enough in exchange for the patent grant." 380 And, as Reichman explains:
[N] either TRIPS nor any other international agreement attempts to establish the
substantive content of industrial applicability (utility), or for that matter, of novelty
and non-obviousness. The reason is that there is no consensus on how to apply these
doctrines: state practices differ. What we find here are open-ended standards, not
rules, whose content continues to evolve over time. 381
Analogously, other scholars have highlighted that the current international intellectual
property regime is "by design, rooted in the disparate practices . . . of different nations. As
such, non-uniformity pervades the very fabric of the TRIPS regime." 382 Article 1.1 of
TRIPS clarifies that "Members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of im-
plementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and prac-
tice." 38 3 Moreover, Article 19.2 of the DSU provides that VTO panels and the Appellate
Body (AB) "cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided for in the cov-
ered agreements."3 84 VTO jurisprudence has confirmed this "space reserved for state
sovereignty."3 85
3. A New Tool to EnJbrce International Intellectual Property Agreements?
Can investment treaty arbitration constitute a new tool to enforce international intellec-
tual property agreements? Can it provide investors with an alternative venue to challenge
the consistency of domestic regulations with the TRIPS Agreement, instead of lobbying
their governments to bring a WTO dispute? And if parallel proceedings are brought
before the VTO dispute settlement mechanism and investment treaty arbitral tribunals
respectively, will arbitral tribunals, VTO panels and the AB show any deference to the
other dispute settlement mechanism? In some exceptional cases, foreign investors have
attempted to use international investment law to indirectly protect other values by requir-
ing a state to respect its international law obligations that are critical to the success of the
investment.3 86 For instance, a Canadian investor filed an investment treaty claim against
Barbados for alleged failure to enforce its own environmental law implementing interna-
378. See id. at 1132-33.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 1134.
381. Jerome Reichman, Compliance of Canada's Utility Doctrine with International Minimum Standards of
Patent Protection, Panelist Presentation at ASIL Panel Proceedings (April 11, 2014) (transcript available on
p. 8 at http://frederickabbott.com/sites/default/files/ASIL%20-%202014%20-%20FA-SS-JR%20consolida
ted_1.pdf).
382. Anderson & Razavi, supra note 24, at 289.
383. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 5, art.1.1.
384. Id. art. 19.2.
385. Anderson & Razavi, supra note 24, at 289.
386. VALENTINA VADI, CULTURAL HERITAGE IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION
129-31 (2014).
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tional obligations. 8 7 As the investor acquired wetlands and subsequently developed them
into an ecotourism facility, he claimed that Barbados had failed to prevent the discharge of
raw sewage into the wetlands and to investigate or prosecute polluters, thus reducing the
profitability of its investment.3 8 8 The way this claim is formulated illustrates a novel form
of interplay between international investment law and other branches of international law.
When adjudicating intellectual property-related investment disputes, the question arises
as to whether arbitral tribunals can take into account and/or apply other bodies of law in
addition to international economic law. Can a breach of the TRIPS Agreement provide
basis for an independent claim in investment treaty arbitration? Investment treaty arbitral
tribunals are of limited jurisdiction and cannot adjudicate on the eventual violation of
international intellectual property law, unless the relevant investment treaty requires them
to do so. In Grand River v. United States, the tribunal held that the fair and equitable
treatment standard in NAFTA Chapter 11 "does not incorporate other legal protections
that may be provided investors or classes of investors under other sources of law"-other-
wise, the standard would become "a vehicle for generally litigating claims based on alleged
infractions of domestic and international law."3 89 In another recent case, 390 the tribunal
agreed with the Claimants that the applicable law "does not incorporate the universe of
international law into the BITs or into disputes arising under the BITs." 391
Yet, when interpreting a treaty, the tribunal can take account of other international
obligations of the parties according to customary rules of treaty interpretation as restated
by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). 392 Article 31.3(c) of the
VCLT provides that there shall be taken into account, together with the context, any
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 39 3 That
is how the intellectual property international obligations of states can be considered in the
adjudication of disputes before arbitral tribunals.394 The TRIPS Agreement can thus pro-
vide "interpretive background" to inform investment treaty standards. 39 5 In this manner,
intellectual property obligations would not mean one thing under investment treaties and
a completely different thing under trade or other international intellectual property
agreements. 396
Given their institutional mandate to settle investment disputes, there is a risk that in-
vestment treaty tribunals water down or overlook noteworthy intellectual property as-
pects. Arbitrators may be perceived as detached from local communities and their
concerns. They may not have specific expertise in intellectual property law, as their ap-
387. Peter A. Allard v. Barbados, UNCITRAL, Notice of Dispute (Sept. 8, 2009).
388. Id. at T 16.
389. Grand River Enter. v. United States, UNCITRAL, Award, T 219 (Jan. 12, 2011), available at http://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0384.pdf.
390. Bernhard von Pezold v. Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/15, Procedural Order No. 2, at ¶ 57
(June 26, 2012), available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ital044.pdf.
391. Id. at T 57.
392. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 206, art. 31(3)(c).
393. Id.
394. For an analogous argument with regard to international cultural law, see Valentina Vadi, Crossed Desti-
nies: International Economic Courts and the Protection of Cultural Heritage, 18 J. INT'L EcON. L. 51, 56 (2015).
395. Gibson, supra note 72, at 472.
396. Okediji, supra note 77, at 1136 (arguing that "[i]t simply cannot be the case that intellectual property
obligations mean one thing under investment treaties and a completely different thing under trade
agreements").
FALL 2015
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
188 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
pointment requires expertise in international investment law. The "interpretative tradi-
tion" of arbitral tribunals has "its own language; way of speaking, expressing ideas, and
defining problems and solutions."397 Arbitral tribunals have their own "inherited inter-
pretative culture"-their own approach to reasoning with rules, a world of shared mean-
ings.398 Furthermore, due to the emergence of a jurisprudence constante in international
investment law, there is a risk that tribunals will conform to these de ficto precedents
without necessarily considering analogous intellectual property-related cases adjudicated
before other international courts and tribunals. This is not to say that consistency in
decision-making is undesirable; obviously, it can enhance the coherence and predictability
of the system contributing to its legitimacy. Yet, the selection of the relevant precedents
matters as it can have an impact on the decision.399
Have arbitral tribunals paid any attention to the specificities of intellectual property?
Are they imposing standards of good intellectual property governance, by adopting gen-
eral administrative law principles, such as proportionality, due process, reasonableness and
others? The critical assessment of such jurisprudence is a fertile endeavour as it may help
in detecting common patterns, leading to the coalescence of general principles of law and/
or customary law requiring an equilibrated balance between the protection of intellectual
property and related investments on the one hand and public welfare on the other. While
international investment law should not be used to enforce intellectual property law, this
is not to say that arbitral tribunals can avoid dealing with intellectual property in some
instances. 400
4. Denial ofustice Claims and Claims offudicial Indirect Expropriation
Another important issue raised by the parallel invocation of the fair and equitable treat-
ment standard and the indirect expropriation provision is the interplay between denial of
justice claims and claims of judicial expropriation.4 0' Denial of justice does not occur if
state courts made a mere error of law. Investment treaty tribunals are not an appeal
mechanism for the decisions of domestic courts. Rather, denial of justice implies the fail-
ure of a national legal system as a whole to satisfy minimum standards of treatment. A
number of arbitrations show that denial of justice is very difficult to prove and that rarely
397. Vadi, supra note 53, at 176-77.
398. For an analogous argument with regard to the VTO Law, see Fiona Smith, Power, Rules and the WTO,
36 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. Rv. 1063, 1080 (2013) ("[I]n this 'world' . . . ideas from outsiders, like human
rights and environmental scholars, about how VTO law should be regulated are often rejected as 'wrong' or
misguided by trade lawyers and policymakers. These ideas often place the individual at the heart of the
analysis and address her diverse and complex needs in ways that simply do not translate readily into the
language of comparative advantage and trade liberalization. We should not really be surprised therefore
when trade experts dismiss them as wrong or misguided, or when such ideas are castigated as
'protectionist'.").
399. See VALENTINA VADI, ANALOGIES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION (2016).
400. For an analogous argument concerning trade law and human rights, see Cristopher McCrudden, Inter-
national Economic Law and the Pursuit of Human Rights: A Framework for Discussion of the Legality of "Selective
Purchasing" Laws under the WTO Government Procurement Agreement, 2 J. INT'L EcON. L. 3, 47 (1999).
401. See generally Mavluda Sattorova, Denial offustice Disguised?: Investment Arbitration and the Protection of
Investors from ]udici al Misconduct, 61 INT'L COMP. L. Q. 223 (2012); Mavluda Sattorova,]udicial Expropiation
or Denial offusice? A Note on Saipem v Bangladesh, 2 INT.'L ARB. L. REv. 35 (2010). On denial of justice in
general, see generally JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (2005).
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has such a claim been successful. Moreover, to invoke denial of justice successfully, the
claimant must exhaust local remedies first, giving the judicial system of the host state a
chance to redress its failure before filing a claim before an investment treaty arbitral
tribunal.402
By contrast, claims of judicial expropriation have not required exhaustion of local reme-
dies. 403 For instance, the Saipem Tribunal found the host state responsible for expropria-
tion resulting from the judicial intervention in arbitral proceedings dismissing the
respondent's objection that the exhaustion of local remedies was a substantive condition
for challenging judicial acts in investment arbitration. Rather, the tribunal clarified that
the local remedies rule would apply in the case of denial of justice, but not in the case
involving judicial expropriation.
The finding that a judicial expropriation has occurred precludes the successful invoca-
tion of denial of justice and, vice versa, the successful invocation of denial of justice pre-
cludes the successful invocation of judicial expropriation. Nonetheless, investors often
make both claims as a matter of strategy. The claim of judicial expropriation can be easier
to substantiate and can be more investor-friendly in terms of eventual compensation.
Therefore, the emergence of this claim in the recent arbitral jurisprudence can affect the
state judiciary autonomy in the pharmaceutical sector.
E. NON-DISCRIMINATION
The non-discrimination principle is a cornerstone of international investment law.404 It
is typically reflected in two investment treaty provisions: the principles of national treat-
ment (NT) and most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment. The basic purpose of the MFN
and NT clauses is to avoid discrimination and to guarantee equal competitive opportuni-
ties for foreign investors in the host state. These two standards do not guarantee a specific
level of protection but are relative standards that require a host country to treat a foreign
investor in the same way that a domestic investor or an investor from another country in
like circumstances would be treated. In order to ascertain whether companies are in "like
circumstances", one should first consider whether they are in the same sector and whether
those comparators have been accorded more favorable treatment than the claimant. Then
in order to ascertain whether there is improper discrimination or a legitimate distinction,
one should consider the impact and objective of the given state measure in the particular
field. 405
In Eli Lilly v. Canada, the case relating to the invalidation of patents, the claimant also
alleges that Canada denied the company national treatment.40 6 First, the company con-
tends that it faces more arduous patent standards in Canada than a Canadian investor
might face in other jurisdictions, such as the United States and Europe. 407 Yet, this form
of extraterritorial analogy is highly unusual in national treatment claims before arbitral
402. PAULSSON, supra note 401, at 130.
403. Sattorova, Note on Saipem, supra note 401, at 35-42; idem., Denial offustice Disguised, supra note 401, at
223-46.
404. Ruse-Khan, supra note 363, at 17.
405. Id. at 18.
406. See Eli Lilly, Notice of Intent, supra note 224, at ¶T 105-07
407. Id. at T 106.
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tribunals. 408 Second, the company argues that domestic generic pharmaceutical compa-
nies received more favorable treatment as they benefitted from the invalidation of the
patent.409 Third, the claimant highlights that only pharmaceutical companies bear the
burden of the promise doctrine, rather than patent holders in other economic sectors.
According to the claimants, the judicial decisions amount to deficto discrimination against
pharmaceutical patents, contrary to the obligation not to discriminate among different
fields of technology under Article 27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement. While the case is still
pending, it can have a significant impact on access to medicines. In fact, if the arbitral
tribunal upheld the claim of the investor, it would be more difficult for generic pharma-
ceutical companies to enter into the relevant market.
In Apotex I, the dispute concerning the approval for generic versions of antidepressant
and anti-cholesterol medicines, 4 10 the claimant contended inter alia that the host state
violated the non-discrimination provision by "failing to treat Apotex in the same fashion
as US investors."4 1 1 As the case was dismissed on jurisdiction, the discrimination claim
became moot. The significance of non-discrimination claims should not be understated.
While, in some arbitrations, arbitral tribunals have upheld such claims as a distinct viola-
tion of the non-discrimination provision in the relevant BIT, in other cases, discrimina-
tion can constitute evidence of the breach of fair and equitable treatment, or be one of the
relevant factors of unlawful expropriation.
In Apotex 11, concerning an import ban on certain pharmaceuticals produced in Ca-
nada, Apotex contended that it had been discriminated against as comparable national and
foreign manufacturers had received better treatment. According to the claimant, the FDA
inspected a competitor's facilities in Israel and found many violations. But it did not issue
an import alert against the Israeli manufacturer. Therefore, according to the claimants,
they were treated more severely than other comparable investors. The United States
countered that manufacturers in the United States are subject to even more regular in-
spections and enforcement due to their location. With regard to foreign comparators, the
U.S. rejects the idea that there should be a lowest common denominator when ensuring
the health and safety standards of medicines. 4 12 The tribunal held that there was no viola-
tion of national treatment, as the claimant and the domestic competitors were not in "like
circumstances." 4 1 3 But, the Tribunal held that the U.S. had treated the Canadian com-
pany less favorably than other foreign companies.4 1 4 According to the Tribunal, since the
U.S. had deficto discriminated against the company, the claimants would prevail on their
most-favored-nation claim, unless the U.S. could establish that it had legitimate reasons
for the different treatment. 415 The Tribunal concluded that the FDA actions were "mate-
rially influenced by the FDA's genuine concerns over shortages of essential drugs manu-
408. Luke Eric Peterson, U.S. Pharma Corp Puts Canada on Notice of Nafta Claim Following Patent Invalidation
at Hands of Canadian Court; More Such Claims in Wings?, INv. ARB. REP. (Dec. 3, 2012) ("This unusual form of
extra-territorial comparison is not commonly seen in National Treatment claims under investment treaties.").
409. Eli Lilly, Notice of Intent, supra note 224 at ¶T 105-07. .
410. Apotex I, Nonce of Arbitration, supra note 261, at T9 58-60.
411. Id. at T 60(f).
412. See Apotex III, Award, supra note 165, at T 3.28.
413. Id. at T 8.57.
414. Id. at T 8.62.
415. Id. at T 8.65.
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factured" by the Israeli manufacturer.4 16 Therefore the Tribunal concluded that since the
companies were not in like circumstances, there was no discrimination. 417
IV. Critical Assessment
What impact can these arbitrations have on the development of international law?
These arbitrations raise important questions regarding the interplay between various in-
ternational law regimes and international investment law. The outcomes of these arbitra-
tions can shape the development of both international law and international investment
law; and the relationship between the two.
In general terms, according to a range of international conventions protecting various
aspects of IP and other international law instruments, states have the right and duty to
adopt regulation governing pharmaceutical products.418 The right to regulate is "an in-
herent power of sovereign States," part and parcel of their sovereign prerogatives. 419 This
is particularly the case with regard to public health which is a salient public value and lies
at the heart of state sovereignty not only because of practical reasons-national authorities
are better placed to appreciate local societies' needs-but also because public health is
central to the very existence of the state: population is recognized to be one of the consti-
tuting elements of statehood. 42 0 Therefore, protecting public health is a primary duty of
states. 42 1 Inevitably, public health policy making is "highly political," as what best serves
the commonwealth may not always be in the interests of all its members. 422 In some
circumstances, the protection and preservation of public health is not possible without
constraining a wide range of private activities. 423 For instance, in early 2000, the U.S.
FDA adopted rules that "created considerable unrest amongst international pharmaceuti-
cal companies." 424 The FDA adopted "Preventive Measures to Reduce the Possible Risk
of Transmission of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD) and Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Dis-
ease (vCJD) by Blood and Blood Products . . . out of concern about the 'Mad Cow Dis-
ease' (BSE) that had erupted in the UK."425 Blood preparations processed by the
pharmaceutical companies using blood from "donors who had spent more than six months
in the UK between 1980 and 1986 could no longer be accepted in the US."426 Report-
edly, "according to German scientists, the health risk posed by the targeted blood trans-
416. Id. at ¶¶ 8.71, 8.73.
417. Id. at T 8.77.
418. Chang-fa Lo, External Regime Coherence: WTO/BIT and Public Health Tension as an Illustration, 7 AsiANJ.
WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL Y 263, 276 (2012) (noting that "the host country has an inherent right to
regulate").
419. Id.
420. VADI, supra note 29, at 30.
421. Id.
422. LAWRENCE GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DuTy, RESTRAINT 6 (2008).
423. VADi, supra note 29, at 31.
424. Marco C. E. J. Bronckers, More Power to the WTO?, 4 J. INT'L EcON. L. 41, 42 (2001).
425. Id.; see U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Guidance for Industry: Revised Preventive Measures to Reduce the Possible
Risk of Transmission of Creutzfeldt-]akob Disease (qJD) and Variant Creutzfeldt-]akob Disease (vCJD) ly Blood and
Blood Products 1, (Jan. 2002), http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/GuidanceComplianceRegulatory-
Information/Guidances/Blood/ucm074089.htm.
426. Bronckers, supra note 424, at 42.
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fers was 'theoretical"' and the regulation lacked scientific basis.427 But, other countries
followed the example.428
While the industry often asserts that economic principles militate against state interfer-
ence, public health has historically constrained the rights of individuals and businesses so
as to prevent nuisance. 429 At the same time there is a risk that governmental authorities
abuse their authority and unnecessarily infringe upon investor rights.430 The question is
whether measures limiting pharmaceutical companies' ability to fully exploit their patents
comply with the relevant provisions of international investment agreements. While com-
mentators have noted that "[flor a long time, the practical relevance of the IP and invest-
ment overlap seemed negligible," this is no longer the case. 4 31 Rather, a number of
arbitrations have emerged where investors have challenged host state measures affecting
pharmaceutical patents, contending that these various regulatory measures amounted to
breaches of the relevant investment treaty provisions. In this context, treaty making and
interpretation play a crucial role.
Some international investment agreements expressly clarify that the exercise of state
regulatory autonomy in the pharmaceutical sector does not per se amount to a breach of
investment treaty provisions. For instance, the U.S. Model BIT of 2012 states that:
This Article does not apply to the issuance of compulsory licenses granted in relation
to intellectual property rights in accordance with the TRIPS Agreement, or to the
revocation, limitation, or creation of intellectual property rights, to the extent that
such issuance, revocation, limitation, or creation is consistent with the TRIPS
Agreement. 432
Analogously, Article 6.5.6 of the Singapore-India FTA reads:
This Article does not apply to the issuance of compulsory licenses granted in relation
to intellectual property rights, or to the revocation, limitation or creation of intellec-
tual property rights to the extent that such issuance, revocation, limitation or creation
is consistent with the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights."4 33
These provisions require interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement. "Failure to comply
with the TRIPS Agreement" provisions "would result in the expropriation clause remain-
ing applicable."434
Yet, the issuance of compulsory licenses, or the creation, limitation, or revocation of
intellectual property rights is regulated only in very broad brushes by the TRIPS Agree-
ment. For instance, with regard to the creation of patents, some fields can be excluded
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. VAi, supra note 29, at 31.
430. Id.
431. Ruse-Khan, supra note 363, at 2.
432. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 6(5) (2012), available at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT
%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf.
433. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of Japan for the
Liberalisation, Promotion and Protection of Investment, Japan-Korea, art. 6.1, March 22, 2002, Treaty No.
17 and Ministry of Foreign Affairs Notification No. 430
434. Mercurio, supra note 76, at 905.
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from patentability and the question of what deserves to be patented is left for countries to
determine. For example, to protect public order or morality, plants, animals and methods
for treatment of humans or animals are matters that can be excluded. The TRIPS Agree-
ment only requires that patents should be granted for new, inventive and useful inven-
tions-but it does not define these terms. 435 Deciding whether a new formulation
(producing a pill version of a drug that formerly came as a powder, for instance), or a new
combination (combining two or more existing molecules into a new pill), or a new use of a
medicine deserves a new twenty-year patent for example is a prerogative of states and is
not determined by the TRIPS Agreement. Countries can therefore determine what kinds
of inventions deserve patents in the area of pharmaceuticals, in light of their own social
and economic conditions. 436 During the patent lifespan, the enjoyment of intellectual
property rights by the patent owner is not absolute: certain rules provide for limited ex-
ceptions and other uses of the patent without the patent owner's consent.4 37 With regard
to revocation, the TRIPS Agreement only requires member states to provide judicial re-
view for every decision to revoke a patent.438 Traditionally, patents can be revoked for
lack of use, lack of payment of annual fees or abuse of dominant position. More recently,
several developing and least developed countries-being depositaries of mega biodivers-
ity-have enacted legislation to prevent biopiracy according to which noncompliance with
disclosure of origin rules leads to the revocation of a patent.4 39
In this scenario, "TRIPS consistency is tested in proceedings outside the (state-to-state)
WTO dispute settlement" mechanism. 440 While WTO jurisprudence can provide some
guidance, only a limited number of IP-related disputes have been brought before the
WTO.441 Therefore, the arbitrations examined above can pave the way to subsequent
WTO decisions. But there is no binding precedent in international law, and both WTO
panels and arbitral tribunals are not bound to follow "precedents" of other jurisdictions.442
The TRIPS Agreement expressly presents clauses regulating the interface between pub-
lic health protection and intellectual property. Notoriously, Article 7 of the TRIPS Agree-
ment provides that:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to
the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the
mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and
obligations.Ap 
,
435. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 27(1).
436. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 27(1)-(2).
437. See id., art. 27.
438. Id., art. 32.
439. Antonietta Di Blase, Traditional Knowledge: Cultural Heritage or Intellectual Property Right?, in CULTURE
AND INTERNATIONAL EcONOMIc LAw 145, 157 (Valentina Vadi & Bruno De Witte eds., 2015).
440. See Ruse-Khan, supra note 363, at 19 (highlighting the risk that "the interpretative result may well be
different from the result achieved in a 'pure' WTO setting").
441. Id. at 20; see generally Pauwelyn, spra note 114.
442. See VADi, supra note 117 (pinpointing that although there is no binding precedent in international law,
both WTO panels and arbitral tribunals are not bound to follow "precedents" of other jurisdictions, they
refer to each other's jurisprudence.).
443. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 7.
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In parallel, Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement states that:
Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt mea-
sures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public
interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological de-
velopment, provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this
Agreement.4 4 4
Such provisions are not exceptions but set forth as fundamental principles of IP govern-
ance that need to be taken into account when interpreting the Agreement as a whole. The
mentioned provisions provide space for reconciliation between private and public interests
in IP regulation. But Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement imposes some limits.44s In par-
ticular, the measures to be adopted need to be consistent with the TRIPS Agreement.44 6
Prima facie, this clause might be interpreted as giving precedence to intellectual property
over other interests. However, a closer reading suggests that it merely requires taking the
whole agreement into account. The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health has further reinforced state regulatory space to adopt public health mea-
sures.
447 As WTO members have experienced difficulties in reconciling patent protection
with access to essential medicines, the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health recognized the WTO members' right to protect public health and to use
the flexibilities provided by the TRIPS Agreement.448 Where clear reference is made to
the TRIPS Agreement, international investment agreements incorporate TRIPS, Articles
7 and 8, entitled "Objectives" and "Principles" respectively, as well as the relevant inter-
pretative background provided by the Doha Declaration. They then become applicable
and may provide guidance in the context of investment disputes.
In some cases, the investment chapters of U.S. FTAs do not refer to compliance with
TRIPS as a safeguard against expropriation claims. Rather they refer to compliance with
their own IP chapters.44 9 For instance, Article 1110(7) of NAFTA exempts "the issuance
of compulsory licensing" and "the revocation, limitation or creation of intellectual prop-
erty rights" from expropriation protection, if such measures are consistent with NAFTA
Chapter 17 governing intellectual property.4 50 NAFTA Chapter 17 contains "TRIPS-
plus" provisions on intellectual property rights, which strengthen the intellectual property
regimes of NAFTA countries beyond the global standards established by the TRIPS
Agreement. For instance, NAFTA Chapter 17 does not include provisions analogous to
444. Id., art. 8.
445. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 8.
446. Id. at art. 8(1).
447. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc. WT/
MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 ILM 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
448. Id. at T 4 ("We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent members from taking
measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement,
we affirm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of
WTO Members' right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all. In
this connection, we affirm the right of WTO members to use, to the full, the provisions of the TRIPS
Agreement which provide flexibility for this purpose."). For commentary, see Frederick Abbott, The Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Lighting a Dark Corner at the WTO, 5. J. INT'L EcON.
L. 469, 493 (2002).
449. See Ruse-Khan, supra note 363, at 19.
450. NAFTA, supra note 74, art. 1110(7)
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Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement. But Article 1709, which governs patents, in-
cludes a number of flexibilities which also appear in the TRIPS Agreement as NAFTA
Chapter 17 was based on a draft of the TRIPS Agreement. 45 ' For instance, states can
exclude certain inventions from patentability, introduce limited exceptions and compul-
sory licenses, as well as revoke the patents.452
In more recent agreements, parties have appended declarations clarifying the interplay
between the expropriation provision (included in the investment chapter) and various IP
provisions (included in the relevant chapter). For instance, in the Canada-EU Compre-
hensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), the parties appended a declaration to
the expropriation provision of Chapter X, which governs foreign direct investment.4 5 3
The declaration clarifies that "investor state dispute settlement tribunals . . . are not an
appeal mechanism for the decisions of domestic courts," and that "the domestic courts of
each Party are responsible for the determination of the existence and validity of intellec-
tual property rights."4 54 The Parties reasserted that "each Party shall be free to determine
the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement regarding in-
tellectual property within their own legal system and practice."4 5 5 The parties also re-
served the possibility to issue binding interpretations at a later stage.456 Moreover, Article
3 of Chapter 22, which governs intellectual property, refers to the Doha Declaration.457
In most cases, however, bilateral investment treaties make no reference to the TRIPS
Agreement. In the absence of an express reference to the TRIPS Agreement, can arbitral
tribunals assert jurisdiction to define the obligations that the host state has entered into
under the TRIPS Agreement and, for that purpose, to interpret the provisions of that
agreement? Unless the applicable BIT refers to the TRIPS Agreement, providing inves-
tors with the possibility of asserting violations of the TRIPS Agreement against host states
451. See Panel Report, Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, T 4.6, WTO Doc. WT/DS114/R
(Apr. 7, 2000) ("While the Uruguay Round negotiations were somewhat in limbo in 1991/1992, the negotia-
tions on a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between Canada, Mexico and the United States
of America were concluded in 1992 and the agreement was signed at the end of 1992. NAFTA contained in
Chapter Seventeen extensive disciplines on the protection of intellectual property rights. The provisions of
Chapter Seventeen were largely based on, and in many instances were a verbatim reproduction of, the provi-
sions of the then draft TRIPS Agreement. Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement was reproduced almost identi-
cally in Article 1709(10) of NAFTA.").
452. NAFTA, supra note 74, arts. 1706(10), 1706(6), 1706(10), 1706(8).
453. Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), Sept. 24, 2014 (not yet in
force).
454. Id., art. X.11, T 6.
455. Id.
456. Id. ("The Parties agree to review the relation between intellectual property rights and investment disci-
plines within 3 years after entry into force of the agreement or at the request of a Party. Further to this
review and to the extent required, the Parties may issue binding interpretations to ensure the proper interpre-
tation of the scope of investment protection under this Agreement in accordance with the provisions of
Article X.27: Applicable Law and Rules of Interpretation of Chapter x (Investment).").
457. See CETA, supra note 453, at ch. 22, art. 3 (recognizing "the importance of the Doha Declaration on
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health adopted on 14 November 2001 by the Ministerial Conference of
the World Trade Organisation," and providing that "In interpreting and implementing the rights and obliga-
tions under this Chapter, the Parties shall ensure consistency with this Declaration" and that "The Parties
shall contribute to the implementation and respect the Decision of the WTO General Council of 30 August
2003 on Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, as well as the
Protocol amending the TRIPS Agreement, done at Geneva on 6 December 2005").
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would be a "radical departure" from the text of the BIT and the Dispute Settlement Un-
derstanding of the WTO.418 As Gibson points out, "[s]hould a country fail to fulfill its
TRIPS Agreement obligations, the WT0's dispute-settlement mechanism .. . provides
procedures for the resolution of state-to-state disputes arising from non-compliance."459
In the absence of a reference to the TRIPS Agreement in the text of the relevant BIT, the
argument that investors can challenge state measures on the basis of the TRIPS Agree-
ment proves to be too much. A state's violation of the TRIPS Agreement cannot provide
a basis for an independent claim under the relevant BIT in investor-state arbitration.
But this does not mean that the TRIPS Agreement is irrelevant. The TRIPS Agree-
ment can provide interpretive guidance and context.4 60 If the applicable law is national
law-as is the case for intellectual property which is territorial in nature-and national law
implements the TRIPS Agreement, the interpretation of the relevant TRIPS provisions
may help the arbitral tribunal to ascertain the legitimacy of the same state measures, their
rationality and reasonableness, and their eventual conformity with international practice.
In turn, this could foster a coherent international framework of IP rules.
Arbitrators have a maieutic role, as they give birth to the meaning of treaty provisions,
having to identify the applicable rules, clarify their meaning and relate them to the specific
facts of the case. Their expertise on intellectual property may be limited. But experts and
amici curiae may be consulted to facilitate sound decision-making.46 1 In any case, arbitra-
tors must be mindful of the two equilibria that characterize IP regulation. While the
intrinsic equilibrium concerns the very structure or architecture of IP norms, the extrinsic
equilibrium indicates the search for balance between IP and other norms. The intrinsic
equilibrium is evident in the conceptual matrix of certain norms of the patent regime.
These provisions do not forbid limitations to intellectual property tout court, but give a
certain margin of appreciation to policy makers and adjudicators to determine what a
lawful delimitation is.
In parallel, the extrinsic equilibrium appears in the interplay between the intellectual
property regime and other fields of law. If one adopts an instrumentalist view of intellec-
tual property, the international IP system should function for the good of all. The notion
that intellectual property regime serves a social function is widely accepted in interna-
tional law, as expressly indicated by Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement.462 In
scrutinizing the complex regime that governs intellectual property, it appears that intellec-
tual property is never absolute.463 Rather, intellectual property rights must be put into
458. See Charles Owen Verrill, Are TO Violations also Contrary to the Fair and Equitable Treatment Obliga-
tions in Investor Protection Agreements? 11 ILSAJ. INT'L & COMP. L. 287, 288-89 (2005).
459. See Gibson, supra note 72, at 422.
460. Gaetan Verhoosel, The Use of Investor-State Arbitration Under Bilateral Investment Treaties to Seek Relief
for Breaches of WTO Law, 6 J. INT'L EcON. L. 493, 503-06 (2003).
461. See, e.g., Eli Lilly v. Canada, Case No. UNCT/14/2, Procedural Order No. 4 (Feb. 23, 2016), available
at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7145.pdf (accepting the intervention of se-
lected amici curiae, including IP professors).
462. See generally, Christophe Geiger, The Social Function of Intellectual Property Rights, or How Ethics can
Influence the Shape and Use of IP Law, MAX PLANK INST. FOR INTELL. PROP. & COMP. L., Research Paper
No. 13-06 (2013).
463. Id., at 5 ("[T]here cannot be an 'absolute' right that can be exercised in a totally selfish manner with no
consideration for the consequences that this exercise involves, but only rights that are 'relativized' by the
rights of others and the well-being of the community.").
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perspective, as they are part of a broader legal system. 464 They "must always be harmo-
nized with other rights of equally significant value and with the interests of the commu-
nity". 465 According to Professor Gervais, "one should not protect beyond what is
necessary to achieve policy objective(s) because the risk of a substantial general welfare
impact is too high." 466 Similarly, Professor Cornides points out that "property is not an
end in itself. Obviously, it must be used in a way that contributes to the realisation of the
higher objectives of human society."46 7
Can the TRIPS Agreement provide arbitral tribunals with some interpretive context?
Certainly, pursuant to Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT, adjudicators should take into account
"any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties." 468
Therefore, "[e]very treaty provision must be read not only in its own context, but in the
wider context of general international law, whether conventional or customary." 469 A
number of international organizations play an active role in the governance of pharmaceu-
tical patents, creating a sort of institutional density or regime complex. 4 70 As all these
organizations receive almost worldwide consensus, a broader perspective of the legal envi-
ronment which surrounds a given dispute should be adopted in investor-state arbitra-
tion.471 In particular, the TRIPS Agreement can provide interpretive context for
investment disputes. 472 In this sense, arbitrators should acknowledge their responsibility
for the charting of the contours of international law norms and, more broadly, as cartogra-
phers of the international legal order.
Conclusion
Pharmaceutical patent-related investment disputes constitute a new and uncharted de-
velopment of the increasingly complex and contested interplay between international in-
vestment law and other fields of public international law. A tension can arise between the
protection of investor's rights and state regulatory autonomy. In some circumstances, the
excessive protection of investors' rights may have negative effects on public health. There
is a risk that the protection of pharmaceutical patents provided by investment treaties
over-emphasizes the private interest and neglects the public interest equally embodied in
intellectual property. Is international investment law a self-contained regime, or is it a
component of public international law? Should it be responsive to other areas of interna-
tional law?
464. Id. at 4.
465. Id.
466. Daniel J. Gervais, The Changing Landscape of International Intellectual Property, in INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY AND FREE TRADE AGREEMENTs 49, 60 (Christopher Heath & Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2007)
(cautioning that "one should not protect beyond what is necessary to achieve policy objective(s) because the
risk of a substantial negative general welfare impact is too high").
467. See Jakob Cornides, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Convergence? 7 J. WORLD INTELL.
PROP. 135, 143 (2004).
468. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 206, art. 31(3)(c).
469. IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 139 (1984).
470. Id.
471. Id.
472. Verhoosel, supra note 460, at 503.
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The new dialectics between intellectual property and public health in patent-related
investment treaty disputes confirms the idea that investment treaty arbitration is a form of
governance, and raises two different issues: 1) the extent to which investment governance
can take into account public interests; and 2) regime collision between different areas of
international law. International investment law and arbitration views the interrelationship
between private corporate actors and the host state as a central issue, and contributes to
building up the international legal status of private actors. At the same time, the prolifera-
tion of international investment agreements and the tremendous success of investment
arbitration as a dispute settlement mechanism raise questions as to whether investment
governance is an autonomous system or a component of public international law. Com-
bined, these two dynamics raise far-reaching issues. Can investment treaty arbitration
uphold/reinforce national policies giving effect to the aims and content of international
law in fields tangential to investment law, such as international health law or human rights
law? To the extent that investment treaty arbitration declines to do so, deemphasizes
these policies and leaves them to one side, this is problematic for moving forward globally
important policy issues through the vehicle of public international law.
This article suggests that international investment law and arbitration should be consid-
ered an important emerging part of public international law and should retain the ideal of
public international law as we know it, as a unitary whole, built on inter-state relations,
and intended to further the common good internationally. Against this theoretical back-
ground, this article submits that interpretation can supply a mechanism for balancing IP
rights against other values. Arbitrators should focus on the nature and purpose of that
which is being protected. Intellectual property rights should not be considered as absolute
rights, but should be interpreted in the light of their goals and limits. Regulations
adopted to protect public health and a range of human rights, depending on the specific
circumstances of the case, might be viewed as an intrinsic limit to the rights associated
with intellectual property. Foreign investments, including pharmaceutical patents, should
not be considered an end in itself, but as one of the available tools to promote human
welfare. Whether arbitrators shall adopt a holistic approach to public health related IP
disputes, as directed by customary rules of treaty interpretation, remains to be seen.
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